# International Relations Theories

# Offensive Realism

## 1NC Frontline

#### Offensive realism is the best way to characterize China’s rise to power

Mearsheimer 14 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the advisory council of The National Interest, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=show)//BW

To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will react to them. We must rely on theory because many aspects of the future are unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in world politics. Offensive realism offers important insights into China’s rise. My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil. It is important to emphasize that my focus is not on how China will behave in the immediate future, but instead on how it will act in the longer term, when it will be far more powerful than it is today. The fact is that present-day China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military nowadays. Contemporary China, in other words, is constrained by the global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America’s favor. Among other advantages, the United States has many consequential allies around the world, while China has virtually none. But we are not concerned with that situation here. Instead, the focus is on a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against the United States, where China controls much more relative power than it does today, and where China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence, we are talking about a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today.

#### China’s rise threatens global stability – causes China to become more than just a regional hegemon

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In its simplest form, my theory maintains that the basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world while also ensuring that no rival great power dominates another area. The theory begins with five assumptions about the world, which are all reasonable approximations of reality. First of all, states are the key actors in international politics, and no higher authority stands above them. There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in the system that states can turn to if they get into trouble and need help. This is called an anarchic system, as opposed to a hierarchic one. The next two assumptions deal with capabilities and intentions, respectively. All states have offensive military capabilities, although some have more than others, indeed sometimes many more than others. Capabilities are reasonably easy to measure because they are largely composed of material objects that can be seen, assessed, and counted. Intentions are a different matter. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states, because intentions are inside the heads of leaders and thus virtually impossible to see and difficult to measure. In particular, states can never know with complete confidence whether another state might have its gun sights on them for one reason or another. The problem of discerning states’ intentions is especially acute when one ponders their future intentions, since it is almost impossible to know who the leaders of any country will be five or more years from now, much less what they will think about foreign policy. The theory also assumes that states rank survival as their most important goal. This is not to say it is their only goal, for states invariably have numerous ambitions. However, when push comes to shove, survival trumps all other goals, basically because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. Survival means more than merely maintaining a state’s territorial integrity, although that goal is of fundamental importance; it also means preserving the autonomy of a state’s policymaking process. Finally, states are assumed to be rational actors, which is to say they are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival. These assumptions, when combined, cause states to behave in particular ways. Specifically, in a world where there is some chance—even just a small one—that other states might have malign intentions as well as formidable offensive military capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by what I call the “9-1-1” problem—the fact that there is no night watchman in an anarchic system whom states can call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Accordingly, they recognize they must look out for their own survival, and the best way to do that is to be especially powerful. The logic here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be at risk. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare attack the United States, because it is so much stronger than any of its neighbors. This reasoning drives great powers to look for opportunities to move the balance of power in their favor, as well as to prevent other states from gaining power at their expense. The ultimate aim is to be the hegemon: that is, the only great power in the system. When people talk about hegemony today, they are usually referring to the United States, which is often described as a global hegemon. However, I do not believe it is possible for any country—including the United States—to achieve global hegemony. One obstacle to world domination is that it is very difficult to conquer and subdue distant great powers, because of the problems associated with projecting and sustaining power over huge distances, especially across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This problem is less acute when dealing with minor powers, but even so, the power of nationalism makes it extremely difficult to occupy and rule a hostile country. The paramount goal a great power can attain is regional hegemony, which means dominating one’s surrounding neighborhood. The United States, for example, is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Although it is plainly the most powerful state on the planet by far, it is not a global hegemon. Once a state achieves regional hegemony, it has a further aim: to prevent other great powers from dominating their geographical regions. In other words, no regional hegemon wants a peer competitor. The main reason is that regional hegemons—because they are so dominant in their neighborhood—are free to roam around the globe and interfere in other regions of the world. This situation implies that regional hegemons are likely to try to cause trouble in each other’s backyard. Thus, any state that achieves regional hegemony will want to make sure that no other great power achieves a similar position, freeing that counterpart to roam into its neighborhood. Most Americans never think about it, but one of the main reasons the United States is able to station military forces all around the globe and intrude in the politics of virtually every region is that it faces no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere. If the United States had dangerous foes in its own backyard, it would be much less capable of roaming into distant regions. But if a rival state achieves regional dominance, the goal will be to end its hegemony as expeditiously as possible. The reason is simple: it is much more propitious to have two or more great powers in all the other key areas of the world, so that the great powers there will have to worry about each other and thus be less able to interfere in the distant hegemon’s own backyard. In sum, the best way to survive in international anarchy is to be the sole regional hegemon.

#### **China poses a direct threat to US global leadership and regional hegemony**

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With the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union two years later, the United States emerged as the most powerful state on the planet. Many commentators said we are living in a unipolar world for the first time in history, which is another way of saying America is the only great power in the international system. If that statement is true, it makes little sense to talk about great-power politics, since there is just one great power. But even if one believes, as I do, that China and Russia are great powers, they are still far weaker than the United States and in no position to challenge it in any meaningful way. Therefore, interactions among the great powers are not going to be nearly as prominent a feature of international politics as they were before 1989, when there were always two or more formidable great powers competing with each other. To highlight this point, contrast the post–Cold War world with the first ninety years of the twentieth century, when the United States was deeply committed to containing potential peer competitors such as Wilhelmine Germany, imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union. During that period, the United States fought two world wars and engaged with the Soviet Union in an intense security competition that spanned the globe. After 1989, however, American policymakers hardly had to worry about fighting against rival great powers, and thus the United States was free to wage wars against minor powers without having to worry much about the actions of the other great powers. Indeed, it has fought six wars since the Cold War ended: Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001–present), Iraq again (2003–11), and Libya (2011). It has also been consumed with fighting terrorists across the globe since September 11, 2001. Not surprisingly, there has been little interest in great-power politics since the Soviet threat withered away. The rise of China appears to be changing this situation, however, because this development has the potential to fundamentally alter the architecture of the international system. If the Chinese economy continues growing at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the United States will once again face a potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force. It is still an open question as to whether China’s economy will continue its spectacular rise or even continue growing at a more modest, but still impressive, rate. There are intelligent arguments on both sides of this debate, and it is hard to know who is right.

#### Annnnnndddddd nuclear war

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The United States and the Soviet Union fortunately never came to blows during the Cold War, although both countries fought wars against smaller states, some of which were allied with their rival. The fact that both sides had large nuclear arsenals is probably the key reason the superpowers never fought against each other. Nuclear weapons, after all, are a major force for peace simply because they are weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of their use are so horrible that it makes policymakers extremely cautious if they think there is even a small chance they might be used in a conflict. Given the history of the Cold War and given that China and the United States both have nuclear arsenals, one might surmise there is little chance those two countries will shoot at each other in the foreseeable future. That conclusion would be wrong, however. Although the presence of nuclear weapons certainly creates powerful incentives to avoid a major war, a future Sino-American competition in Asia will take place in a setting that is more conducive to war than was Europe during the Cold War. In particular, both geography and the distribution of power differ in ways that make war between China and the United States more likely than it was between the superpowers from 1945 to 1990.

#### Offensive realism is the most real world IR theory

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Regarding John Mearsheimer's views, it is important to differentiate his per- sonal views from his theory of offensive realism. His theory provides an explanation why the U.S. should carry out a revisionist policy. However, Mearsheimer, in an interview conducted by Lisa Bastarache (2004), explained his personal views on realism: Many people think that I accept with a certain amount of glee the fact that the world operates according to realist dictates. But that's not my view at all. I find international relations to be a deeply depressing subject, because it is filled with so many horror stories. The international system is a very dangerous place in which to operate. I wish that we didn't live in a realist world, but in a more benign one instead. The reason that I am a realist is not because I relish realism from a normative or philosophical point of view, but because I think that it is the best theory we have for understanding how the world works. Clearly, Mearsheimer's work may explain why the U.S. embraced a revi- sionist policy, but it seems that he was against the war, not only at theoretical level, as he thought Saddam Hussein's regime could be contained, but also at a normative level because he considered it a choice that would have made the world more unstable

## 2NR/1NR

### China=Offensive Realist

#### Chinese naval power is offensive realist

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This compact, closely reasoned and comprehensively documented account seeks to answer not only the how, but, more importantly, the why of China’s spectacular rise as a naval power. Yves-Heng Lim analyzes what he calls the physiognomy of the Chinese navy to determine how the structure of the service informs us as to its ultimate objective. Many have suggested that the navy was developed with a view to recapturing Taiwan or that Chinese naval vessels were required to protect the sea lanes along which the commercial cargoes of China’s export-driven economy flow. Not so, Lim argues. Instead, we need to look to the larger dynamics of great-power interactions as seen through the lens of offensive-realist analysis. Lim draws heavily on the work of Mearsheimer and Waltz in the first half of his book, in which he looks at mounting tensions between the United States, which he styles a “distant great power”, and China, the “potential regional hegemon”. It is clearly in China’s interest to marginalize neighboring regional states in order to undercut America’s naval presence in East Asian waters. According to the offensive-realist school, China will be impelled to seek a position of exclusive dominance in those waters and this will necessitate eroding, if not neutralizing, the capabilities of the United States Navy. In keeping with this imperative, China, as a weaker naval power, has employed a classic Jeune École sea denial strategy. What Beijing hopes to do is to render it far too costly for US carrier battle groups or major fleet units to operate in the approaches to China. More specifically, the Chinese navy and its related services want to realize the vision advanced by Admiral Liu Huaqing, who argued that first the Chinese navy should seek to exercise sea denial out to the First Island Chain (the arc of islands running from the Japanese archipelago south to Taiwan and the Philippines). Subsequently, if this goal is achieved, the perimeter should be expanded to the Second Island Chain, roughly 1,500 miles from the Chinese coast. Lim enumerates the impressive inventory of naval assets that China, traditionally a land power, has assembled over the past three decades. He points out, for example, that the navy has acquired five new classes of destroyers, four new classes of frigates and three new classes of diesel-electric submarines, not to mention a refurbished aircraft carrier. Drawing upon the ground-breaking work of scholars like Bernard Cole and Andrew Erickson, he demonstrates how the Chinese have rendered their warships more and more capable and sophisticated. What is equally important in his analysis is the “dog that didn’t bark”: the ships that are strangely absent from the Chinese navy’s order of battle. He highlights the puzzling absence of major amphibious assets. That absence would be truly puzzling if Beijing’s real aim were to re-take Taiwan. It is far less so if one embraces Lim’s central thesis that Taiwan is a peripheral consideration and that the real objective is to ensure that the US navy, as the principal vehicle for the exercise of American power in Asia, will be unable to prevent China’s hegemonic ambitions. The concluding portions of Lim’s work are particularly valuable. In these chapters, he studies in detail the long-standing perceptions of Chinese naval operations. What, for example, would be involved in taking Taiwan? Would, in fact, a naval invasion be worth it? Would it not be simpler to strangle the Taiwanese economy by utilizing submarines, mines and missiles to seal off Taiwan? Similarly, Lim shows that, despite the attention given to events in the South China Sea, the energy resources there are only a secondary concern in Beijing’s world view, and the regional navies are too small and too disunited to constitute much more than an annoyance in the event of hostilities. Instead, the real objective is to buy critical strategic depth in the larger competition with the United States for regional dominance. A crucial feature of the sea denial scenario is the multiplication of Chinese anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles: missiles that can be launched not only from the shore but also from ships, aircraft and submarines. These, like the Dong Feng 21D, have the potential to be, in common parlance, real game-changers. The DF 21D is a ballistic missile which allegedly has a re-entry warhead capable of hitting American aircraft carriers. What is vital in these calculations is the supporting panoply of satellites, drones and communication networks required to ensure precise targeting. The Americans will seek to destroy these supporting systems as part of their own Air–Sea Battle sea command strategy. Lim has done us a service in bringing together a wide variety of Western and Chinese sources to demonstrate persuasively that what is at stake in the Western Pacific is a titanic struggle at sea to determine, in large part, whether China emerges as the uncontested hegemon of East Asia.

Dire straits

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What are the implications for Taiwan of China’s continued rise? Not today. Not next year. No, the real dilemma Taiwan will confront looms in the decades ahead, when China, whose continued economic growth seems likely although not a sure thing, is far more powerful than it is today. Contemporary China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior, and not by a small margin, to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the American military nowadays. China, in other words, is constrained by the present global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America’s favor. But power is rarely static. The real question that is often overlooked is what happens in a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against Taiwan and the United States, in which China controls much more relative power than it does today, and in which China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence: a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today. That world may seem forbidding, even ominous, but it is one that may be coming. It is my firm conviction that the continuing rise of China will have huge consequences for Taiwan, almost all of which will be bad. Not only will China be much more powerful than it is today, but it will also remain deeply committed to making Taiwan part of China. Moreover, China will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere, which means it will seek to reduce, if not eliminate, the American military presence in Asia. The United States, of course, will resist mightily, and go to great lengths to contain China’s growing power. The ensuing security competition will not be good for Taiwan, no matter how it turns out in the end. Time is not on Taiwan’s side. Herewith, a guide to what is likely to ensue between the United States, China and Taiwan. I n an ideal world, most Taiwanese would like their country to gain de jure independence and become a legitimate sovereign state in the international system. This outcome is especially attractive because a strong Taiwanese identity—separate from a Chinese identity—has blossomed in Taiwan over the past sixty-five years. Many of those people who identify themselves as Taiwanese would like their own nation-state, and they have little interest in being a province of mainland China. According to National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center, in 1992, 17.6 percent of the people living in Taiwan identified as Taiwanese only. By June 2013, that number was 57.5 percent, a clear majority. Only 3.6 percent of those surveyed identified as Chinese only. Furthermore, the 2011 Taiwan National Security Survey found that if one assumes China would not attack Taiwan if it declared its independence, 80.2 percent of Taiwanese would in fact opt for independence. Another recent poll found that about 80 percent of Taiwanese view Taiwan and China as different countries. However, Taiwan is not going to gain formal independence in the foreseeable future, mainly because China would not tolerate that outcome. In fact, China has made it clear that it would go to war against Taiwan if the island declares its independence. The antisecession law, which China passed in 2005, says explicitly that “the state shall employ nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures” if Taiwan moves toward de jure independence. It is also worth noting that the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country, and according to President Obama, Washington “fully supports a oneChina policy.” Thus, the best situation Taiwan can hope for in the foreseeable future is maintenance of the status quo, which means de facto independence. In fact, over 90 percent of the Taiwanese surveyed this past June by the Election Study Center favored maintaining the status quo indefinitely or until some later date. The worst possible outcome is unification with China under terms dictated by Beijing. Of course, unification could happen in a variety of ways, some of which are better than others. Probably the least bad outcome would be one in which Taiwan ended up with considerable autonomy, much likeHong Kong enjoys today. Chinese leaders refer to this solution as “one country, two systems.” Still, it has little appeal to most Taiwanese. As Yuan-kang Wang reports: “An overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s public opposes unification, even under favorable circumstances. If anything, longitudinal data reveal a decline in public support of unification.” In short, for Taiwan, de facto independence is much preferable to becoming part of China, regardless of what the final political arrangements look like. The critical question for Taiwan, however, is whether it can avoid unification and maintain de facto independence in the face of a rising China. Hong Kong enjoys today. Chinese leaders refer to this solution as “one country, two systems.” Still, it has little appeal to most Taiwanese. As Yuan-kang Wang reports: “An overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s public opposes unification, even under favorable circumstances. If anything, longitudinal data reveal a decline in public support of unification.” In short, for Taiwan, de facto independence is much preferable to becoming part of China, regardless of what the final political arrangements look like. The critical question for Taiwan, however, is whether it can avoid unification and maintain de facto independence in the face of a rising China. state and that it eventually becomes an integral part of China. Chinese leaders insist that Taiwan must be brought back into the fold sooner rather than later and that hopefully it can be done peacefully. At the same time, they have made it clear that force is an option if they have no other recourse. The security story is a different one, and it is inextricably bound up with the rise of China. Specifically, it revolves around a straightforward but profound question: How is China likely to behave in Asia over time, as it grows increasingly powerful? The answer to this question obviously has huge consequences for Taiwan. The only way to predict how a rising China is likely to behave toward its neighbors as well as the United States is with a theory of great-power politics. The main reason for relying on theory is that we have no facts about the future, because it has not happened yet. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we have no choice but to rely on theories to determine what is likely to transpire in world politics. My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025. In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—which means being the only great power in the system. What exactly does it mean to be a hegemon in the modern world? It is almost

### Offensive Realism Key

#### Offensive realism is the most effective way to understand how major world powers make decisions

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Consequently, I employ Mearsheimer's theory with Glenn Snyder's suggestion in mind: that offensive realism helps us understand the behaviour of revisionist states (2002: 172-173). In other words, what is needed is not so much a grand theory that can explain great powers' strategies, but a theory that may help us understand what factors influence great powers' decisions to pursue offensive or defensive strategies. The changing balance of power in the international system might be an important factor influencing great powers' decisions. However, given that democratic great powers challenge Mearsheimer's theory, offensive realism should also study how domestic variables may affect a great power's foreign policy strategy (Rose 1998). Considering how domestic variables can affect a state's decision to expand power is a tricky undertaking. However, combining systemic variables with domestic ones would produce a more complete picture of why some states are revisionists and other status quo oriented (see Schweller 1998: Chapter 1). Eric Labs' (1999) work on offensive realism may be a good way of addressing this problem, as he explains how domestic factors can influence a great power's decision to seek more power. Using Britain during the First World War as a case study, Labs tests three hypotheses to demonstrate the reasons why British war aims expanded during the war to include the expansion of the empire to the Middle East. He concludes by showing how his social mobilization hypothesis best explains why the British government expanded its war aims, arguing that they were part of the government's effort to mobilize society to assure access to the country's resources and to increase public support for the war at a time of increasing British losses

#### Offensive realism is the only way to understand why the US involves itself in conflicts

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Both systemic and domestic factors after the 9/1 1 attacks provided an opportunity for Bush and his advisors to forge a new foreign pol- icy strategy that enabled it to expand its power in the Middle East. But the objective was not just ousting Saddam Hussein's regime from power, but also to use the war as a step towards global hegemony, as described in Mearsheimer's work. Although this argument seems to be treading the conspiratorial line, it is not. Prior historical examples show that international events can move a dovish public to more hawkish positions, giving leaders the opportunity to accomplish what they consider to be important aims. Domestic concerns are not the sole determinants of why a nation is willing to go on the offensive. As Mearsheimer's theory suggests, states are rational actors and they expand power when international conditions are ripe for such ven- tures. As a consequence, I propose a two-step argument. If there are no or few systemic restraints, and public opinion backs the use of force for offensive purposes, then leaders in a democratic polity will be free to pursue offensive strategies and use the war as a way of expanding their hegemony. However, if a democratic polity's public is critical of offensive strategies, even if systemic conditions are ripe, leaders will be less able to execute these strategies. A good example is the U.S.'s decision to go to war against Spain in 1898. The war may have been fought to help Cubans achieve their independence or as retribution for the 266 sailors that died in the explosion of the U.S. S Maine in Havana harbour, which many Amer- icans at the time blamed on Spain (McCormick 2005: 25; Smith 1995: 34). However, the war permitted the US. to establish an over- seas empire, an objective many leaders during that time period favoured. One of these leaders was Theodore Roosevelt, who at the time was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and had passionately, along with Henry Cabot Lodge and Captain Alfred Mahan, promoted the virtues of expanding America's territorial holdings (Karsten 1 97 1 : 585-86; Fensterwald 1951: 118). Although these events helped turn public opinion in favour of going to war, the prevailing balance of power at the time, the European powers' willingness to accept Spain's decline and America's rise to great power status also allowed the U.S. to pursue a war against Spain (Zimmerman 2002: 261). This is a good example for two reasons. First, it suggests that combining offensive realism with domestic factors, as Labs' work argues, is possible. Second, this example elucidates why the U.S. was successful at establishing regional hegemony. Mearsheimer contends that the Monroe Doctrine allowed it to minimize European involvement in the hemisphere and that America's westward expansion turned it into a great power (2001: 242-252). This explanation is too simplistic. The U.S. may have had much latent power, but it did not have the will to mobilize it in pursuit of an overseas empire. The new imperial possessions allowed the U.S. to protect the hemi- sphere from foreign threats, as Mahan (see Karsten 1971) argued before the Spanish-American War, but it is important to stress that the McKinley administration's decision to expand America's territorial size was nurtured by events it had no control over. Consequently, domestic factors are as important as systemic factors, as both enabled the McKinley administration to establish its hegemony over the western hemisphere.

#### We live in a realist world only offensive realism can create an effective platform for International Relations

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Regarding John Mearsheimer's views, it is important to differentiate his per- sonal views from his theory of offensive realism. His theory provides an explanation why the U.S. should carry out a revisionist policy. However, Mearsheimer, in an interview conducted by Lisa Bastarache (2004), explained his personal views on realism: Many people think that I accept with a certain amount of glee the fact that the world operates according to realist dictates. But that's not my view at all. I find international relations to be a deeply depressing subject, because it is filled with so many horror stories. The international system is a very dangerous place in which to operate. I wish that we didn't live in a realist world, but in a more benign one instead. The reason that I am a realist is not because I relish realism from a normative or philosophical point of view, but because I think that it is the best theory we have for understanding how the world works. Clearly, Mearsheimer's work may explain why the U.S. embraced a revi- sionist policy, but it seems that he was against the war, not only at theoretical level, as he thought Saddam Hussein's regime could be contained, but also at a normative level because he considered it a choice that would have made the world more unstable

### SCS

#### International Organizations, such as the United Nations, have no power to decrease tensions in the SCS—shows how realist China is

**Freedberg 16** (Sydney Freedberg Jr. [cred: deputy editor for Breaking Defense, graduated summa cum laude from Harvard and holds masters' degrees from Cambridge and Georgetown], 6-20-16, Breaking Defense, “UN Ruling Won’t End South China Sea Dispute: Navy Studies Next Clash,” http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/un-ruling-wont-end-south-china-sea-dispute-navy-studies-next-clash/)

A UN tribunal ruling could trigger the next round of brinksmanship in the South China Sea as early as next week. But don’t expect the ruling to *end* the dispute, especially since the Chinese have already vowed to ignore an adverse ruling. “It’s…not likely to be resolved this year or by one international ruling, no matter how brilliant the arbitrators are,” said Patrick Cronin of the Center for a New American Security. “So it’s going to be a long term (issue) for the next administration.” The US has taken the rare step of deploying two supercarriers side-by-side in the West Pacific, a dramatic exercise in deterrence. But “if after the arbitration ruling, which may come as soon as next week now, China doesn’t like the result, what if they just *ignore* the carriers….and say ‘we’re moving our dredgers into the Scarborough Shoal (and) we’re actually going to build our own artificial island here,'” Cronin asked at the CNAS annual conference this afternoon. “What are you going to do about it?” China is seeking to neutralize US power in two ways. The high-end counter is to build an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) network. This layered defense of cyber/electronic weapons, long-range sensors, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, strike planes, submarines, and mines aims to keep US forces from meddling in what China considers its backyard. This is the high-end deterrent. But China’s much more likely to *use* its low-end force, the maritime equivalent of Vladimir Putin’s deniable Little Green Men: Chinese Coast Guard vessels, dredging ships (as in Cronin’s hypothetical scenario), and fishing boats that can push into disputed territory *without* raising the risk of a military clash. This is forcing the US Navy to think hard. In fact, “we’ve got a lot of studies going on right now, (and) by the July-August timeframe, we’re going to have a lot of exciting ideas,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson told the CNAS conference. Press attention has fixated on whether the Navy will say increasing threats require it to grow beyond its current goal of 308 ships (protip: It will). But what’s at stake is much more than that, Adm. Richardson made clear to me after his public remarks. “It’s not just the number, but what shape does that fleet take and what sort of capabilities do we need to be bringing to bear and how are we going to go after those,” the CNO told me. “We’ve got a lot of intellectual energy going on (and) in the late summer-fall, we should be hearing some results.”

#### Chinese attempts to militarily control the South China Sea exemplifies its desire to control its region

**Cheng 15** (Dean Cheng [cred: bachelor's degree in politics from Princeton University in 1986 and studied for a doctorate at MIT, studies Chinese policy and military doctrine and IR with the US], 11-4-15, National Interest, “How China Views the South China Sea: As Sovereign Territory,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-views-the-south-china-sea-sovereign-territory-14249)

With the decision to conduct a Freedom of Navigation operation (FONOP) in the waters around China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, U.S.-Chinese relations appear set to deteriorate in the coming year. Given the likely rise in tensions, especially if the United States conducts additional FONOPS, it is essential that U.S. leaders understand the Chinese perspective, even as they must make clear to Beijing (and others) that they are firmly committed to the principle of freedom of the seas. Some have attempted to explain China’s approach by comparing it to the Monroe Doctrine. China, they say, is intent on asserting a sphere of influence, in which its interests are accorded primacy. We should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, Chinese leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to interfere in disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically important body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own. An alternative analogy often drawn likens China to either imperial,Wilhelmine or even Nazi Germany. In this portrayal, China is intent upon expanding its territorial holdings; the islands of the South China Sea are a twenty-first-century version of Alsace-Lorraine, or Danzig. Missing from both of these attempts to recast China’s actions into more familiar ground is the role of sovereignty in the Chinese conception of its claims. Beijing does not see its South China Sea activities in the same light as either nineteenth-century America or twentieth-century Germany. In protesting the entry of the USS *Lassen* into the waters near the artificial island China has built atop Subi Reef, the Chinese used language that makes their concerns quite clear. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lu Kang declared that the USS *Lassen* “illegally entered waters near relevant islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands without the permission of the Chinese government.” He added that Beijing “has stressed on many occasions that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters. China’s sovereignty and relevant rights over the South China Sea have been formed over the long course of history.”

#### Resources play an important role in Chinese SCS motivation

**Emmerson 16** (Donald Emmerson [cred:heads the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University], 5-24-16, The Diplomat, “Why Does China Want to Control the South China Sea?” http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/why-does-china-want-to-control-the-south-china-sea/)

The disputes over the South China Sea are complex, and they overlap and collide in complex ways. At stake are questions of ownership, demarcation, rights of passage, and access to resources—fish, oil, and gas. The resulting imbroglio implicates all six claimants, not only China but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam as well. It is wrong to blame China alone for all that has happened in the South China Sea—nationalist moves, stalemated diplomacy, and the potential for escalation. That said, no other claimant has come even close to matching the speed and scale of China’s efforts. In just two years, unannounced and unilateral acts of dredging and reclamation have created more than 3,200 acres of usable hard surface on the seven features that China occupies in the Spratlys. Ports, runways, buildings, and barracks have been built to accommodate military or civilian ships, planes, and personnel. Radar systems have been installed. Floating nuclear-energy platforms are envisioned. Seen from Beijing, these are not matters of Chinese foreign policy. Under Chinese law, most of the South China Sea is part of Hainan province—in effect, a Chinese lake. In Beijing’s eyes, these vast waters and their bits of natural and artificial land are already in China’s possession and under its administration—a conviction embodied in the ban on foreigners who fish in them without China’s prior permission.

### China Threats

#### China is engaging in a cultural offensive war with the world

**Dynon 14** (Nicholas Dynon [cred:], 2-20-14, The Jamestown Foundation, “China’s Idealogical ‘Soft War’: Offense if the Best Defense,” http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=41985&cHash=c3e865ae7e469e6e55dfcf4c526ac9e9#.V3qzDrgrK00)

“Exporting ideology” is used as a pejorative term by Beijing to refer to a state or non-state actor attempting to indoctrinate a country’s government and/or people. The Chinese concept of the export of ideology (*shuchuyishixingtai* (v.); *yishixingtaishuchu* (n.)) incorporates notions of hegemony, homogenization and universalism. Beijing conceptualizes “exporting ideology” as a universalizing endeavor in which a state or non-state actor seeks to globalize their ideology by replacing all others. Thus, it associates Western neoliberalism and religious fundamentalism (such as wahhabi Islamism) with the export of ideology, demonstrated in recent times by such phenomena as the “color” revolutions, the spread of jihadist violence and the erosion of indigenous cultural values. Western neo-liberalism is described by Chinese political commentator Fu Yong as a form of “postmodern imperialism,” in which the objective is neither land, resources nor direct political control, but rather ideological dominance (*Global View*, June 2006). China, we are told, does not export ideology but rather promotes its culture and economic cooperation overseas, seeking greater understanding and acceptance with the goal of a multipolar and ideologically heterogeneous world. It is a line regularly invoked in relation to China’s development assistance and trade cooperation with Africa. In relation to its relations with Africa, veteran Chinese diplomat Liu Guijin, states that Beijing “strictly follows the principle of equality and mutual benefit.” Its dealings with the continent are not for the “export of ideology and development mode, not to impose its own social system, not to attach political strings… nor to seek privileges or a ‘sphere of influence’ ” (address given at the *2010 China-Africa Economic Cooperation Seminar*). Accordingly, socialist countries, including China, are depicted as victims or targets—not perpetrators—of ideological export. China’s experience of receiving ideological export is thus articulated in terms of “ideological infiltration” or “ideological and cultural infiltration” (*sixiang/wenhua shentou*). China, for example, has been the target of ideological infiltration by wahhabi Islamic doctrine in the troublesome autonomous region of Xinjiang. China’s people have as a whole have been victims of infiltration by the Western values of money worship, hedonism and extreme individualism and, in North Korea, Western imperialist ideological and cultural infiltration is reported to be “more vicious than ever” (*China.com*, September 2, 2013). Cheng Enfu, head of the Institute of Marxism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, notes that, the infiltration of American ideology and values into other countries has accelerated with globalization and technology, with ideological security (*yishixingtai anquan*) facing increasingly severe challenges from information networks (*Global Times*, June 3, 2013). In acknowledgment of this, national ideological security has been elevated as a policy imperative under Xi Jinping. Listing “cultural threats” among its five focuses, China’s new National Security Committee, announced after the Party's third plenum in November, is the latest in a string of initiatives to shore up ideological security. Colonel Gong Fangbin, a professor at the National Defense University, pinpoints “the ideological challenges to culture posed by Western nations” as a target of the committee (*South China Morning Post*, January 14). **Surviving Cold War 2.0—a ‘Soft War’** The Global Financial Crisis is seen by a number of Chinese theorists as emblematic of the declining economic power of the West relative to China and BRICS economies. This decline has precipitated a shift in European and US foreign strategy away from economics to a greater reliance on soft power and a strengthening of ideological exports (*Guangming Daily*, June 27, 2013). China thus finds itself thrust into an era of ideological “soft war” (*ruanzhan*). Unlike a hot, cold or hard war, a soft war is a contest of soft power in which the purpose of each state is to “protect its own national interests, image and status so as to promote a stable international environment conducive to its development” (*Liberation Daily*, May 10, 2010). In the soft war era, states Zhao Jin, Associate Professor at Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Studies, international relations is no longer a hard power scenario in which “might is right,” but where “morality” and “justification” become the basis of relative state power (*Liberation Daily*, April 23, 2010). Originally used by Iranian authorities following the disputed presidential election of 2009, the term “soft war” referred to a climate of opposition that forced the government to crack down on dissent though media controls and propaganda campaigns. Robert Worth, writing for the *New York Times* (November 24, 2009), comments that the term is “rooted in an old accusation [by Iran’s leaders]: that Iran’s domestic ills are the result of Western cultural subversion.” The alleged strategy of soft war, writes University of Pennsylvania professor Munroe Price, “is one of encouraging internal disintegration of support for the government by undermining the value system central to national identity” (*CGCS Mediawire*, October 22, 2012). It undermines a society’s values, beliefs and identity to “force the system to disintegrate from within.” Price notes that broadcasters in the West often point to the collapse of the Soviet bloc as a triumphant example of the use of media in “altering opinion and softly preparing a target society to become a more intense demander of democratic change” (*International Journal of Communication*, 6, 2012). Although a desirable model in the West, it is regarded a cautionary tale in Beijing, an example of the West’s strategy of “peaceful evolution” (*heping yanbian*). Formulated during the Cold War by former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the strategy pursued “peaceful” transitions from dictatorship to democracy in communist countries. Researchers in China have assessed that the fundamental reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union was a lack of cultural construction, leaving the socialist system without a bulwark against the West’s strategy of peaceful evolution (Zhang Ji, Qi Chang’an, *Socialism Studies* 6, 2003). Thus, the production of culture in China remains firmly controlled by the Party. Within China’s domestic political discourse, the terms “ideology” and “culture” are often used together and often interchangeably, and responsibility is placed on the media and cultural workers to correctly guide public thinking. Dissent, as we have seen with Beijing’s recent crackdowns on rogue journalism and internet rumors, continues to be stifled (for more on the recent crackdowns, see “The Securitization of Social Media in China” in *China Brief*, February 7). The continuing development of the culture industry to promote ideology and to project China’s soft power both at home and abroad is thus intended “to ensure cultural security as well as the nation-state’s image.” **[1]** **Shaping a Favorable International Environment: Culture on the Offensive** Delivering a speech at a group study session of members of the Political Bureau of the Party’s Central Committee on 30 December 2013, president Xi Jinping called for deeper reform of China’s cultural system in order to build a solid foundation for the nation’s cultural soft power (*wenhua ruanshili*) (Xinhua, January 1). Xi said that “the stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread and characteristics of China well explained.” Beijing’s international cultural charm offensive is, according to official pronouncements, about making China understood so as to minimize uninformed misgivings over China’s rise among international audiences. The objective is perhaps nowhere more clearly articulated than by Minister for Culture, Cai Wu, when addressing Xinhua reporters during an August 2010 interview: We aim to carry out cultural exchanges with China not to export ideology and mode of development , but through the dissemination of Chinese culture, so our culture can be truly attractive, to impress people, resonate , strike a chord , win respect , enhance communication of the mind, and seek understanding and cooperation so that the outside world gains a comprehensive, accurate understanding of the true face of contemporary China; thereby creating a more favorable international environment for our modernization (Xinhua, August 6, 2010). But there is clearly a range of views about the role that the international promotion of culture should play in Chinese strategy. In his 1998 *Analysis of China’s National Interests*, which won the China Book Prize, Tsinghua University’s Yan Xuetong observes that “exporting ideology is a major part of promoting Chinese culture. It is also an important way to raise China’s international status.” According to Yan, whose views are purported to closely reflect those of Beijing, China’s quest to enhance its status and the United States’ efforts to maintain its current position is a “zero-sum game.” It is the battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who ultimately prevails, and that the country that displays the most “humane authority” will win. Yan’s zero-sum game echoes the characterization of the soft war era put forward by his junior Tsinghua University colleague Zhao Jin, in which “morality” and “justification” become the basis for a state’s relative power. In this sense, we see a link between moral authority and soft power: the more widespread the acceptance of a state’s moral authority within the international system, the greater its soft power. The logic of commanding the international moral high ground within a soft war era thus requires that a state achieve moral authority among a more dominant collection of states than do its competitors. The “favorable international environment” in which Beijing seeks to pursue China’s development is one that requires claiming this high ground, allowing China to rise unencumbered by an international moral consensus dominated by the West. It has required a posture that—despite Beijing’s foreign policy rhetoric—is outward looking. It necessitates the recruiting of partners to Beijing’s way of thinking and away from the West’s. It requires—and results in—the projection of its ideology beyond its borders. Thus, China exports its ideology to markets around the world in direct and targeted competition with Western ideological exports, competition that is being played out most intensively in regions such as Africa, Central Asia and Latin America.

#### China seeks to control the East Asian Region

**Emmerson 16** (Donald Emmerson [cred:heads the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University], 5-24-16, The Diplomat, “Why Does China Want to Control the South China Sea?” http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/why-does-china-want-to-control-the-south-china-sea/)

What does Beijing want in the South China Sea? The answer is: control. That answer raises additional questions: Will China actually *gain* control over the South China Sea? If not, why not, and if so, how? How much and what kind of control? Among varieties of dominance from the least to the most oppressive, many qualifying adjectives are possible. Minimal, superficial, selective, extractive, patronizing, censoring, demanding, suppressive, and despotic are but a few that come to mind, and fluctuations over time are possible across this spectrum from smiles to frowns in either direction. For Asia and the wider world, the relevance of these uncertainties is clear. But the original, primary question—what China wants—can be retired, at least for now. It has been answered by China’s behavior. The notion that the government of China does not know what it wants in the South China Sea is no longer tenable. Its actual behavior says what it wants. It wants to control the South China Sea. Obviously that body of water and its land features are not coterminous with Southeast Asia, nor with East Asia, Asia, Eurasia, or the Asia-Pacific, let alone the world. One can only speculate whether and how far the goal of control applies across any, some, or all of these concentric arenas of conceivable ambition. In those zones, why China wants control is still a fatally prejudicial—presumptive—question. Not so in the South China Sea. In that setting, knowing the subjective motivations, objective causes, and announced reasons for Beijing’s already evident pursuit of control could help lower the risk of future actions and outcomes damaging to some or all of the parties concerned, not least among them China itself.

#### China power forces the US out of Asia

Mearsheimer 14 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the advisory council of The National Interest, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=show)//BW

There was another job to be done to achieve regional hegemony: push the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere and keep them out. This goal is what the Monroe Doctrine is all about. The United States was not powerful enough to act on those principles when President James Monroe articulated them in 1823; but by the end of the nineteenth century, the European great powers had become minor players in the Americas. The United States had achieved regional hegemony, which made it a remarkably secure great power. A great power’s work is not done once it achieves regional hegemony. It must then ensure that no other great power follows suit and dominates its own area of the world. During the twentieth century, four countries had the capability to strive for regional hegemony: Wilhelmine Germany (1890–1918), imperial Japan (1937–45), Nazi Germany (1933–45), and the Soviet Union (1945–90). Not surprisingly, each tried to match what the United States had achieved in the Western Hemisphere in the preceding century. How did the United States react? In each case, it played a key role in defeating and dismantling those aspiring hegemons. The United States entered World War I in April 1917, when it looked as if Wilhelmine Germany might win the war and rule Europe. American troops played a critical role in tipping the balance against the Kaiserreich, which collapsed in November 1918. In the early 1940s, President Roosevelt went to great lengths to maneuver the United States into World War II to thwart Japan’s ambitions in Asia and especially Germany’s ambitions in Europe. After entering the war in December 1941, the United States helped to demolish both Axis powers. Since 1945, American policymakers have taken considerable pains to limit the military capabilities of Germany and Japan. Finally, the United States steadfastly worked to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia during the Cold War and then helped relegate it to the scrap heap of history between 1989 and 1991. Shortly after the Cold War ended, George H. W. Bush’s administration boldly stated in its famous “Defense Guidance” of 1992, which was leaked to the press, that the United States was now the lone superpower in the world and planned to remain in that exalted position. American policymakers, in other words, would not tolerate the emergence of a new peer competitor. That same message was repeated in the equally-famous National Security Strategy issued by George W. Bush’s administration in September 2002. There was much criticism of that document, especially its claims about the value of “preemptive war.” But hardly a word of protest was raised regarding the assertion that the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position in the global balance of power. The bottom line is that the United States worked hard for over a century to gain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, and it did so for sound strategic reasons. After achieving regional dominance, it has worked equally hard to keep other great powers from controlling either Asia or Europe. What does America’s past behavior tell us about the rise of China? In particular, how should we expect China to conduct itself as it grows more powerful? And how should we expect the United States and China’s neighbors to react to a strong China?

#### Chinese economic growth escalates regional conflicts

Mearsheimer 14 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the advisory council of The National Interest, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=show)//BW

If China continues its striking economic growth over the next few decades, it is likely to act in accordance with the logic of offensive realism, which is to say it will attempt to imitate the United States. Specifically, it will try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. It will do so primarily because such domination offers the best way to survive under international anarchy. In addition, China is involved in various territorial disputes and the more powerful it is, the better able it will be to settle those disputes on terms favorable to Beijing. Furthermore, like the United States, a powerful China is sure to have security interests around the globe, which will prompt it to develop the capability to project military power into regions far beyond Asia. The Persian Gulf will rank high on the new superpower’s list of strategically important areas, but so will the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, China will have a vested interest in creating security problems for the United States in the Western Hemisphere, so as to limit the American military’s freedom to roam into other regions, especially Asia. Let us consider these matters in greater detail.

#### China threatens Asia stability

Mearsheimer 14 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the advisory council of The National Interest, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=show)//BW

If my theory is correct, China will seek to maximize the power gap with its neighbors, especially larger countries like India, Japan, and Russia. China will want to make sure it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries. One major difference between China and the United States is that America started out as a rather small and weak country located along the Atlantic coastline that had to expand westward in order to become a large and powerful state that could dominate the Western Hemisphere. For the United States, conquest and expansion were necessary to establish regional hegemony. China, in contrast, is already a huge country and does not need to conquer more territory to establish itself as a regional hegemon on a par with the United States. Of course, it is always possible in particular circumstances that Chinese leaders will conclude that it is imperative to attack another country to achieve regional hegemony. It is more likely, however, that China will seek to grow its economy and become so powerful that it can dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, and make it clear they will pay a substantial price if they do not follow the rules. After all, this is what the United States has done in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in 1962, the Kennedy administration let both Cuba and the Soviet Union know that it would not tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba. And in 1970, the Nixon administration told those same two countries that building a Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos was unacceptable. Furthermore, Washington has intervened in the domestic politics of numerous Latin American countries either to prevent the rise of leaders who were perceived to be anti-American or to overthrow them if they had gained power. In short, the United States has wielded a heavy hand in the Western Hemisphere. A much more powerful China can also be expected to try to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region, much as the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere in the nineteenth century. We should expect China to devise its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as imperial Japan did in the 1930s. In fact, we are already seeing inklings of that policy. For example, Chinese leaders have made it clear they do not think the United States has a right to interfere in disputes over the maritime boundaries of the South China Sea, a strategically important body of water that Beijing effectively claims as its own.

#### China’s got more to lose than win when waging regional wars

**Fravel ‘10**

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International relations scholars disagree about a rising China’s potential for involvement in armed conflict. Scholars who examine China’s rise through the lens of either power transition theory or offensive realism often predict a violent future for China because of the benefits that it could seize through The People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces Order of Battle (c. 2005). Source: Produced by the Author with GIS M. Taylor Fravel 525 force. By contrast, scholars who stress the effects of economic interdependence in the international system reach more optimistic conclusions by noting the high costs that China would pay for aggression in a globalized and interdependent world. Looking beyond the Taiwan conflict, territorial conflict for China over the next two decades will not pay. This conclusion is reached through a detailed analysis of the potential benefits of territorial expansion and China’s ability to capture these benefits through the use of force. Put simply, the benefits of expansion are limited, and China’s ability to capture them is weak. When weighed against the high and certain costs of conflict that other scholars have identified, the likelihood of expansion is low. Although China’s rise is unlikely to witness increased conflict over territory other than Taiwan, several limits of the analysis should be noted. First, China may also use force for reasons unrelated to territorial control. As noted in the introduction, although territorial conflict has been the leading issue over which states have gone to war in the past, it is only one of several potential sources of conflict for rising powers. Other potential pathways of conflict deserve further research, such as the establishment of spheres of influence, considerations of status and prestige in the system, or competitive arms races. Nevertheless, future conflict for one important reason, control over territory, is unlikely. Second, the assumption of rationality used in the informal expected utility approach might not completely or accurately capture how China’s leaders view the potential benefits of expansion or assess China’s military capabilities. Psychological or perceptual factors may lead Chinese elites to see greater benefits in expansion than contained in this article. Nevertheless, the expected utility approach provides a useful baseline for examining when these other factors may become more prominent in Chinese decision making in the future. The examination of Chinese perspectives on future territorial conflict offers another fruitful avenue for future research. Two areas where multiple benefits of expansion overlap will nevertheless be important to watch in the future. The first is the Russian Far East, a sparsely populated area once part of the Qing where China could mobilize domestic support to release lateral or population pressure. If the need for arable land or living space increases, and Russian military power declines, then the benefits of expansion would grow. The second area where multiple benefits overlap is in maritime East Asia. In the South China Sea and East China Sea, territorial disputes over contested islands and maritime delimitation claims partially overlap with a perception of large deposits of oil and natural gas. Moreover, these waters are seen in China as ‘‘historic’’ and traditionally Chinese. Here, however, China is likely to enhance its maritime area denial capabilities, not seize disputed islands held by other states. China’s naval presence in these waters will no doubt increase, but China will be unable to control the access of other navies. The limited utility of expansion also carries important implications for the study of international relations. China’s rise today provides a critical case for theories such as power transition theory and offensive realism that predict the onset and severity of great power conflict. This article demonstrates, however, that the value of a key variable creating incentives for conflict in these theories, the bene- fits to be gained through aggression, is much lower in the case of conflict over territory than their application to China suggests. This finding increases confidence in the predictions of those scholars who stress the effects of economic interdependence on state behavior. At the same time, this conclusion is reached not by examining just the costs of aggression, but also by probing the likely benefits. China may eschew territorial expansion over the coming decades, but one important reason is that it will not pay for China to do so in the first place.

#### China is expanding to avoid containment

**Emmerson 16** (Donald Emmerson [cred:heads the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University], 5-24-16, The Diplomat, “Why Does China Want to Control the South China Sea?” http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/why-does-china-want-to-control-the-south-china-sea/)

Less generously:  The United States is not about to attack China, by sea, land, or air, and Beijing knows it. It is precisely that knowledge that has allowed China to entrench itself so successfully, acre by acre, runway by runway, missile by missile, without triggering a truly kinetic American response. Americans are still significantly involved in violent conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East. Americans are tired of war. Washington knows that it needs to cooperate with Beijing. Among the surviving would-be presidents, Hillary Clinton regrets voting for the Iraq War; ex-conscientious objector Bernie Sanders opposes war; and Donald Trump says he makes deals not wars. If Sino-American bloodshed is so unlikely, why would China want to militarize the South China Sea to defend itself against the U.S.? Perhaps Beijing is trying to deter a threat that falls short of war, namely, containment. But Sino-American interactions are too many and too vital for an American president to want to quarantine the world’s most populous country and second-largest economy, even if that were possible, which it is not. The Obama administration wants China to be constructively engaged with others inside the existing global political economy. A cooperative, responsible China is in the interest of the United States and the planet.

### US Heg

#### China doesn’t stop at regional hegemony

Mearsheimer 14 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the advisory council of The National Interest, “Can China Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204?page=show)//BW

In its simplest form, my theory maintains that the basic structure of the international system forces states concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world while also ensuring that no rival great power dominates another area. The theory begins with five assumptions about the world, which are all reasonable approximations of reality. First of all, states are the key actors in international politics, and no higher authority stands above them. There is no ultimate arbiter or leviathan in the system that states can turn to if they get into trouble and need help. This is called an anarchic system, as opposed to a hierarchic one. The next two assumptions deal with capabilities and intentions, respectively. All states have offensive military capabilities, although some have more than others, indeed sometimes many more than others. Capabilities are reasonably easy to measure because they are largely composed of material objects that can be seen, assessed, and counted. Intentions are a different matter. States can never be certain about the intentions of other states, because intentions are inside the heads of leaders and thus virtually impossible to see and difficult to measure. In particular, states can never know with complete confidence whether another state might have its gun sights on them for one reason or another. The problem of discerning states’ intentions is especially acute when one ponders their future intentions, since it is almost impossible to know who the leaders of any country will be five or more years from now, much less what they will think about foreign policy. The theory also assumes that states rank survival as their most important goal. This is not to say it is their only goal, for states invariably have numerous ambitions. However, when push comes to shove, survival trumps all other goals, basically because if a state does not survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. Survival means more than merely maintaining a state’s territorial integrity, although that goal is of fundamental importance; it also means preserving the autonomy of a state’s policymaking process. Finally, states are assumed to be rational actors, which is to say they are reasonably effective at designing strategies that maximize their chances of survival. These assumptions, when combined, cause states to behave in particular ways. Specifically, in a world where there is some chance—even just a small one—that other states might have malign intentions as well as formidable offensive military capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by what I call the “9-1-1” problem—the fact that there is no night watchman in an anarchic system whom states can call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Accordingly, they recognize they must look out for their own survival, and the best way to do that is to be especially powerful. The logic here is straightforward: the more powerful a state is relative to its competitors, the less likely its survival will be at risk. No country in the Western Hemisphere, for example, would dare attack the United States, because it is so much stronger than any of its neighbors. This reasoning drives great powers to look for opportunities to move the balance of power in their favor, as well as to prevent other states from gaining power at their expense. The ultimate aim is to be the hegemon: that is, the only great power in the system. When people talk about hegemony today, they are usually referring to the United States, which is often described as a global hegemon. However, I do not believe it is possible for any country—including the United States—to achieve global hegemony. One obstacle to world domination is that it is very difficult to conquer and subdue distant great powers, because of the problems associated with projecting and sustaining power over huge distances, especially across enormous bodies of water like the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This problem is less acute when dealing with minor powers, but even so, the power of nationalism makes it extremely difficult to occupy and rule a hostile country. The paramount goal a great power can attain is regional hegemony, which means dominating one’s surrounding neighborhood. The United States, for example, is a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Although it is plainly the most powerful state on the planet by far, it is not a global hegemon. Once a state achieves regional hegemony, it has a further aim: to prevent other great powers from dominating their geographical regions. In other words, no regional hegemon wants a peer competitor. The main reason is that regional hegemons—because they are so dominant in their neighborhood—are free to roam around the globe and interfere in other regions of the world. This situation implies that regional hegemons are likely to try to cause trouble in each other’s backyard. Thus, any state that achieves regional hegemony will want to make sure that no other great power achieves a similar position, freeing that counterpart to roam into its neighborhood. Most Americans never think about it, but one of the main reasons the United States is able to station military forces all around the globe and intrude in the politics of virtually every region is that it faces no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere. If the United States had dangerous foes in its own backyard, it would be much less capable of roaming into distant regions. But if a rival state achieves regional dominance, the goal will be to end its hegemony as expeditiously as possible. The reason is simple: it is much more propitious to have two or more great powers in all the other key areas of the world, so that the great powers there will have to worry about each other and thus be less able to interfere in the distant hegemon’s own backyard. In sum, the best way to survive in international anarchy is to be the sole regional hegemon.

#### Chinese power leads to territorial disputes and challenges to US hegemony

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These ambitious goals make good strategic sense for China (although this is not to say China will necessarily be able to achieve them). Beijing should want a militarily weak and isolated India, Japan, and Russia as its neighbors, just as the United States prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. What state in its right mind would want other powerful countries located in its region? All Chinese surely remember what happened over the last century when Japan was powerful and China was weak. Furthermore, why would a powerful China accept U.S. military forces operating in its backyard? American policymakers object when other great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere, because they view those foreign forces as potential threats to American security. The same logic should apply to China. Why would China feel safe with U.S. forces deployed on its doorstep? Following the logic of the Monroe Doctrine, would not China’s security be better served by pushing the American military out of the Asia-Pacific region? All Chinese surely remember what happened in the hundred years between the First Opium War (1839–42) and the end of World War II (1945), when the United States and the European great powers took advantage of a weak China and not only violated its sovereignty but also imposed unfair treaties on it and exploited it economically. Why should we expect China to act differently than the United States? Are the Chinese more principled than we are? More ethical? Are they less nationalistic? Less concerned about their survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is why China is likely to follow basic realist logic and attempt to become a regional hegemon in Asia. Although maximizing its prospects of survival is the principal reason China will seek to dominate Asia, there is another reason, related to Beijing’s territorial disputes with some of its neighbors. As Taylor Fravel points out, China has managed to settle most of its border conflicts since 1949—seventeen out of twenty-three—in good part because it has been willing to make some significant concessions to the other side. Nevertheless, China has six outstanding territorial disagreements, and there is little reason—at least at this juncture—to think the involved parties will find a clever diplomatic solution to them. Probably China’s most important dispute is over Taiwan, which Beijing is deeply committed to making an integral part of China once again. The present government on Taiwan, however, believes it is a sovereign country and has no interest in being reintegrated into China. Taiwanese leaders do not advertise their independence, for fear it will provoke China to invade Taiwan. In addition, China has ongoing disputes with Vietnam over control of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, and with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands, which are also located in the South China Sea. More generally, China maintains that it has sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea, a claim disputed not only by its neighbors but by the United States as well. Farther to the north in the East China Sea, Beijing has a bitter feud with Japan over who controls a handful of small islands that Tokyo calls the Senkaku Islands and China labels the Diaoyu Islands. Finally, China has land border disputes with Bhutan and India. In fact, China and India fought a war over the disputed territory in 1962, and the two sides have engaged in provocative actions on numerous occasions since then. For example, New Delhi maintains there were 400 Chinese incursions into Indian-controlled territory during 2012 alone; and in mid-April 2013, Chinese troops—for the first time since 1986—refused to return to China after they were discovered on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control. It appears that China has been stepping up its cross-border raids in recent years in response to increased Indian troop deployments and an accompanying growth in infrastructure. Given the importance of these territorial disputes to China, coupled with the apparent difficulty of resolving them through the give-and-take of diplomacy, the best way for China to settle them on favorable terms is probably via coercion. Specifically, a China that is much more powerful than any of its neighbors will be in a good position to use military threats to force the other side to accept a deal largely on China’s terms. And if that does not work, China can always unsheathe the sword and go to war to get its way. It seems likely that coercion or the actual use of force is the only plausible way China is going to regain Taiwan. In short, becoming a regional hegemon is the best pathway for China to resolve its various territorial disputes on favorable terms.

#### Military power is the only way sustain HEG

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To this point, the NSS is in line with the logic of offensive realism. Motivated by fear and insecurity, the U.S. is willing to use its capabilities to expand its hegemony. Mearsheimer's definition of hegemony - as a state that dominates all other states in a region or the international system - suggests that a hegemonic state must enjoy military primacy over potential challengers. More importantly, it must be free to execute its strategies to maintain and expand its position of power. This not only requires investments and integration of new military technologies, but it also necessitates nuclear supremacy. Fear of nuclear attacks becomes an important reason not to pursue a revisionist policy. Thus, Bush's national missile defence system and the other aspects of his assertive counter-proliferation strategy are clear intentions of a desire to freely execute his administration's strategies. Rumsfeld's 'capabilities-based' approach also emphasizes that the U.S. does not differentiate an enemy nation from a friendly one. By concentrating on capabilities, rather than actual threats, Rumseld implicitly affirms offensive realism's view that today's friend can be tomorrow's enemy. Moreover, Bush's unilateralism and his suspicion of multilateral bodies also acknowledges Mearsheimer's view that these bodies are 'marriage of conveniences' that must be abandoned when the national interest collides with international ones.

### Impacts

#### Leads to Chinese power projection

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In addition to pursuing regional hegemony, a rising China will have strategic interests outside of Asia, just as the United States has important interests beyond the Western Hemisphere. In keeping with the dictates of offensive realism, China will have good reason to interfere in the politics of the Americas so as to cause Washington trouble in its own backyard, thus making it more difficult for the U.S. military to move freely around the world. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union formed a close alliance with Cuba in good part for the purpose of interfering in America’s backyard. In the future, relations between the United States and a country like Brazil will perhaps worsen, creating an opportunity for China to form close ties with Brazil and maybe even station military forces in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, China will have powerful incentives to forge ties with Canada and Mexico and do whatever it can to weaken America’s dominance in North America. Its aim will not be to threaten the American homeland directly, but rather to distract the United States from looking abroad and force it to focus increased attention on its own neighborhood. This claim may sound implausible at present, but remember that the Soviets tried to put nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in 1962, had more than 40,000 troops in Cuba that same year, and also provided Cuba with a wide variety of sophisticated conventional weapons. And do not forget that the United States already has a huge military presence in China’s backyard. China will obviously want to limit America’s ability to project power elsewhere, in order to improve Beijing’s prospects of achieving regional hegemony in Asia. However, China has other reasons for wanting to pin down the United States as much as possible in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, China has major economic and political interests in Africa, which seem likely to increase in the future. Even more important, China is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, and that dependence is apt to grow significantly over time. China, like the United States, is almost certain to treat the Persian Gulf as a vital strategic interest, which means Beijing and Washington will eventually engage in serious security competition in that region, much as the two superpowers did during the Cold War. Creating trouble for the United States in the Western Hemisphere will limit its ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and Africa. To take this line of analysis a step further, most of the oil that China imports from the Gulf is transported by sea. For all the talk about moving that oil by pipelines and railroads through Myanmar and Pakistan, the fact is that maritime transport is a much easier and cheaper option. However, for Chinese ships to reach the Gulf as well as Africa from China’s major ports along its eastern coast, they have to get from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean, which are separated by various Southeast Asian countries. The only way for Chinese ships to move between these two large bodies of water is to go through three major passages. Specifically, they can go through the Strait of Malacca, which is surrounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, or they can go farther south and traverse either the Lombok or the Sunda Strait, each of which cuts through Indonesia and leads into the open waters of the Indian Ocean just to the northwest of Australia. Chinese ships then have to traverse the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea to reach the Persian Gulf. After that, they have to return to China via the same route. Chinese leaders will surely want to control these sea lines of communication, just as the United States emphasizes the importance of controlling its primary sea routes. Thus, it is hardly surprising that there is widespread support in China for building a blue-water navy, which would allow China to project power around the world and control its main sea lines of communication. In brief, if China continues its rapid economic growth, it will almost certainly become a superpower, which means it will build the power-projection capability necessary to compete with the United States around the globe. The two areas to which it is likely to pay the greatest attention are the Western Hemisphere and the Persian Gulf, although Africa will also be of marked importance to Beijing. In addition, China will undoubtedly try to build military and naval forces that would allow it to reach those distant regions, much the way the United States has pursued sea control.

#### Leads to extensive containment policies

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The historical record clearly demonstrates how American policymakers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. Since becoming a great power, the United States has never tolerated peer competitors. As it demonstrated throughout the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world’s only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States will go to great lengths to contain China and do what it can to render it incapable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave toward China largely the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China’s neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they, too, will do whatever they can to prevent it from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China’s ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China’s rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and eventually China, joined forces with the United States during the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union.

#### That leads to proxy wars, threat construction, travel restrictions, ban of foreign students, and kills the economy

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If a Sino-American security competition developed, it would have twelve main ingredients. To begin with, there would be crises, which are major disputes between the two sides in which there is a serious threat that war will break out. Crises might not occur frequently, but it would be surprising if there were none over long stretches of time. Arms races would be another central feature of the rivalry. Both superpowers, as well as China’s neighbors, would expend significant amounts of money on defense in order to gain an advantage over the other side and prevent it from gaining an advantage over them. We should expect to see proxy wars, in which Chinese and American allies fight each other, backed by their respective patrons. Beijing and Washington are also likely to be on the lookout for opportunities to overthrow regimes around the world that are friendly to the other side. Most of those efforts would be covert, although some would be overt. We should also see evidence of each side’s pursuing a bait-and-bleed strategy when there is an opportunity to lure the other side into a costly and foolish war. And in cases where there is no baiting, but the other side nevertheless finds itself in a protracted war, we would expect to see its rival pursue a bloodletting strategy, in which it seeks to prolong the conflict as much as possible. Moving away from the battlefield, we would find abundant evidence of government officials in Beijing and Washington identifying the other side as their number one threat. Public and classified documents outlining military strategy would clearly depict the other country as a dangerous adversary that needs to be countered. Furthermore, American and Chinese think tanks that deal with national security issues would devote a large portion of their attention to scrutinizing the rival superpower and portraying it as a formidable and threatening adversary. Of course, some people in both countries will reject this confrontational approach and instead recommend deep-seated cooperation with the other side, perhaps even including appeasement of the adversary on certain issues. Over time, we would expect these individuals to be marginalized in the discourse and policy debates. Beijing and Washington can also be expected to put travel restrictions on visitors from their rival, as the Soviet Union and the United States did during the Cold War. We would, furthermore, anticipate seeing the United States bar Chinese students from studying subjects at American universities that have direct relevance for the development of weapons and other technologies that might affect the balance of power between the two countries. In related moves, both countries would surely place selected export controls on goods and services that have a significant national security dimension. The likely model here for the United States is CoCom, which it established during the Cold War to limit the transfer of sensitive technologies to the Soviet Union. None of this is to deny the likelihood of substantial economic intercourse between China and the United States in the midst of their security competition. Nor is it to deny that the two superpowers will cooperate on a handful of issues. The key point, however, is that the relationship between the two countries will be conflictual at its root and that the struggle between them will manifest itself in the ways described above. Of course, my argument is not just that there will be an intense security competition but that there will also be a serious chance of war between China and the United States. Let us consider in more detail the possibility that China’s rise will lead to a shooting war.

#### Chinese rise to power displaces the US – leads to war and conflict

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To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory of international politics that explains how rising great powers are likely to act and how the other states in the system will react to them. We must rely on theory because many aspects of the future are unknown; we have few facts about the future. Thomas Hobbes put the point well: “The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only, but things to come have no being at all.” Thus, we must use theories to predict what is likely to transpire in world politics. Offensive realism offers important insights into China’s rise. My argument in a nutshell is that if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony. Most of Beijing’s neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will join with the United States to contain Chinese power. The result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil. It is important to emphasize that my focus is not on how China will behave in the immediate future, but instead on how it will act in the longer term, when it will be far more powerful than it is today. The fact is that present-day China does not possess significant military power; its military forces are inferior to those of the United States. Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military nowadays. Contemporary China, in other words, is constrained by the global balance of power, which is clearly stacked in America’s favor. Among other advantages, the United States has many consequential allies around the world, while China has virtually none. But we are not concerned with that situation here. Instead, the focus is on a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against the United States, where China controls much more relative power than it does today, and where China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States. In essence, we are talking about a world in which China is much less constrained than it is today.

### Japan

#### Japan relies on America’s nuclear deterrence against China

**Mochizuki ‘07**

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What then are the implications of offensive realism for Japan and its relations with China? Christopher Twomey, who like Mearsheimer places primacy on capabilities rather than intentions in strategic calculations, posits that Japan has heretofore enjoyed conventional security relative to China because of the favorable balance of conventional military capabilities and the advantage of strategic geography (the body of water that separates Japan from China).6 But according to Twomey, Japan is vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons. As long as Japan refuses to possess nuclear weapons of its own, it will have to rely on America’s extended nuclear deterrence. In other words, Japanese ‘internal balancing’ has so far been adequate to deal with a potential threat from China’s conventional military capabilities. But to counter China’s nuclear threat, Japan has engaged in ‘external balancing’ through its alliance with the United States (US). By ultimately relying on the US security commitment to Japan, however, there is also an element of ‘buck-passing’ in that Japan is having the United States bear the nuclear burden to deter Chinese aggression against Japan. But the viability of this ‘external balancing’ and ‘buck-passing’ strategy depends on the credibility of extended US nuclear deterrence. Therefore, Japan has a strong incentive to reduce the danger of ‘decoupling’ or ‘abandonment’ by the United States. The American factor will therefore loom large in Japan’s strategic calculations as China rises. Mearsheimer offers two potential scenarios from his offensive realist perspective. One scenario involves a slowdown of China’s economic growth and maintenance of Japan as the wealthiest state in Northeast Asia, leaving the region without a potential hegemon. In this case, Mearsheimer asserts that the United States would disengage from Northeast Asia militarily. He implies that this disengagement would result from two factors. First, with no state with the potential to become a regional hegemon, the US would be less committed to be a ‘pacifying force’ and defend Northeast Asia. Second, Japan will assert its strategic independence because it questions the reliability of America as an offshore balancer. As a consequence, 6 Christopher P. Twomey, ‘The Dangers of Overreaching: International Relations Theory. The US-Japanese Alliance, and China’, in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.), An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center 2002), 16–19. Jennifer Lind makes a similar argument about Japan’s robust air and naval capabilities in relation to China’s. But rather than viewing these capabilities as a form of ‘internal balancing’, she frames Japan’s conventional military modernization in terms of a general ‘buck-passing’ strategy. See Jennifer M. Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy’, International Security 29/1 (Summer 2004), 92–121. 742 Mike M. Mochizuki Downloaded by [Georgetown University] at 11:56 04 July 2016 according to Mearsheimer, ‘Japan would almost surely establish itself as a great power, building its own nuclear deterrent and significantly increasing the size of its conventional forces.’ The result would be dangerous. Mearsheimer writes that China ‘would be tempted to use force to prevent a nuclear Japan’. Moreover, ‘although China is militarily too weak to fight a major war with the mighty United States, China is not likely to be as outgunned by Japan, which simply does not have the population nor the wealth to fully replace America’s military power’.7 The other scenario entails a China continuing to grow economically at a brisk pace and establishing itself as a potential hegemon. In this case, the United States ‘would either remain in Northeast Asia or return someday to make sure that China does not become a peer competitor’. According to Mearsheimer, to counter China’s inclination to become a real hegemon, ‘all of its rivals, including the United States, would encircle China to try to keep it from expanding’. But Mearsheimer does not specify what role Japan might play in such an encirclement strategy. Given the keen US interest to prevent Chinese hegemony in Northeast Asia, would Japan choose to ‘buck-pass’ and ‘free-ride’ or ‘cheap-ride’ on the United States? Or would Japan engage in balancing China both ‘internally’ by building up its own military capability and ‘externally’ by tightening its alliance with the United States? If the former, by how much would Japan expand its military capabilities? Would Japan’s ‘internal balancing’ include nuclearization? If Tokyo emphasizes ‘external balancing’, then how much would it be willing to contribute to its alliance with the United States? If the Japanese material and behavioral contribution is meager, then ‘external balancing’ can blend into a form of ‘buck-passing’.

### Taiwan

#### China takes Taiwan, more conflicts likely to come.

**Today 16**

(couldn’t find the author yet) October 27th, 2015 China set to invade, retake Taiwan by 2020: Taipei Today Online

China has completed its planned build-up of joint forces for military engagement against Taiwan and is on its way to ensure victory in a decisive battle by 2020, Taiwan’s Defence Ministry said in its National Defence Report ­released today (Oct 27). The 13th edition of the biennial report states that China has recently held military exercises simulating ­attacks by the People’s Liberation ­Army (PLA) on Taiwan’s landmarks and government buildings. “The PLA has possessed an ­adequate deterrent force capable of launching joint military operations against Taiwan,” it said. The PLA also continues to step up the deployment of missiles against Taiwan and aims to upgrade its long-range strike capability. “Its goal is to be in complete combat readiness status to invade Taiwan by 2020,” the report said. Apart from the deployment against Taiwan, China is strengthening the combat readiness of its navy and air force in the west Pacific region to avoid any foreign intervention in cross-strait conflicts, it said. China’s navy and air force have successfully penetrated the “first island chain” on numerous occasions and hope to be able to deter foreign intervention should a war break out in the Taiwan Strait, it said. The “first island chain” refers to a strategic concept of an offshore ­defence line extending from Japan’s Okinawa and Taiwan down to the Philippines and Indonesia. While the Taiwan Strait remains a strategic priority of China’s military development, the report said Beijing has recently attached increasingly greater importance to the **East China Sea and the South China Sea**. In the East China Sea, China has increased patrols in waters off the disputed Diaoyu Islands, called Senkaku in Japan, which administers them, and Tiaoyutai in Taiwan, which also claims them. In the South China Sea, China has not only strengthened its military presence but also continued land reclamation efforts, seeking to reaffirm its sovereignty claim over the reefs and islands in the disputed region. The report said China’s military spending has maintained a two-digit growth over the years. While China earmarked 911.4 billion yuan (S$199.7 billion) for military spending this year, the real figure could be two to three times more, it said. By contrast, Taiwan’s defence budget has showed a declining trend over the past decade, remaining at ­between NT$252.5 billion (S$10.8 billion) and NT$334 billion. Taiwan and China have been governed separately since they split in a civil war in 1949. Beijing has since ­tried to isolate Taiwan, which it ­regards as a renegade province awaiting reunification by force — if necessary. Relations between Taiwan and China have significantly improved since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou was first elected in 2008. Since then, both sides have signed 23 agreements. Despite a cross-strait detente, many suspect the Chinese are using cross-strait trade to draw Taiwan economically closer, leading to eventual political union. KYODO NEWS

#### China will initiate Taiwan conflict.

**Li ‘16**

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Still, the theoretical expectations of offensive realism should apply to the Taiwan issue in at least one crucial aspect: i.e. when the PRC suspects Taiwan of adopting adversarial policies with American support, it will more likely react with extraordinary hostility toward the perceived menace. In the 1950s, Beijing twice initiated crises in the Taiwan Strait, due to its consternation at the growing collaboration between Chiang Kai-shek (who was determined to return to the Chinese mainland by launching a military counteroffensive against the CCP) and the United States. In 1995–1996, Beijing conducted aggressive military maneuvers in the strait, on the grounds that the ‘Taiwanese separatists’ led by President Lee Teng-hui were receiving more visible support from Washington and could only be deterred by a massive show of Chinese arms (see Fravel, 2008, pp. 228 to 229, 252–255, 258 to 259). In this sense, the PRC’s approach toward Taiwan is not dissimilar to its strategy of handling other territorial disputes, as much of Chinese behavior depends on Beijing’s perceptions of the threat posed by an adversary’s relations with a rival great power. The ultimate question for this study is, will an ascending China succeed in pushing America out of Asia? Both theory and reality suggest that the answer is no. To begin with, China’s rise is not necessarily accompanied by America’s decline, and it would take Beijing at least several decades to shift the strategic balance in its own favor (Beckley, 2011; Nye, 2012). Short of a decisive power transition, the PRC cannot establish its centrality in the regional order. Even if the power transition occurs, it is doubtful that China’s neighbors will sever their security links to America and stake theirs hopes on Chinese benevolence, given the structural imperatives that require states to beware and hedge against unbalanced power. For Beijing, there is still a long way to go to overcome these forbidding structural hurdles. To force its neighbors into subservience is not a rational choice, but a mindless act of hubris that could only worsen China’s regional position.

# Defensive Realism

## 1NC Frontline

#### 1. Defensive realism is the best explanation for China’s behavior in the SCS conflict

Raditio 14 (Klaus Heinrich Raditio (PhD student at the Department of Government and International Relations of the University of Sydney; Junior Policy Associate at China Studies Centre of the University of Sydney.), “China and the Tension in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective,” University of Sydney, 2014, https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Klaus%20Raditio.pdf //mw)

**China is a defensive realist state** It is necessary to identify the nature of the states involved to discover whether a security dilemma applies in the SCS, because security dilemmas only take place between defensive realist states. Although Tang mentions security dilemmas between two states, this paper argues that it can apply between two or more states. In this context, this paper aims to elaborate the situation in the SCS among its claimants, especially between China on the one side, and other SCS claimants, i.e. Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, on the other side. Unlike an offensive realist state, which seeks security by power maximisation even if it violates other states’ security, a defensive realist state does not pursue security by offending others, unless it has very exceptional reasons.'? In fact, a defensive realist state is very reluctant to launch attacks, and prefers a resistance behaviour when facing an imminent threat. Is In addition, a defensive realist state pursues security instead of expansion and considers cooperation a feasible means of self-defence." A defensive realist state also voluntarily restrains itself and accepts other countries' constraints." The main military strategy of a defensive realist state is self-defence and deterrence, not expansion. It favours a strategy between engagement and passive containment, and rejects active containment, let alone preventive war.2' From the above-mentioned criteria for a defensive realist state, one can be assured that China is a defensive realist state, as well as other claimants in the SCS, mainly Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. These countries do not have ambitions to expand, and seek security in terms of self-help instead of pursuing hegemonic power. The debate on China's nature will be much more intensive and vigorous compared with other claimants in the SCS. This is because China has been accused of being assertive, aggressive and abrasive in the SCS, whereas other claimants have seldom been accused of such things. I argue that the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia can be categorised as defensive realist states, because of their non-expansionary behaviour and their attitude towards cooperation. Regarding China, Tang argues that, since 1978, the country has shifted from being an offensive realist state to a defensive realist state. Furthermore, Tang attributes China's success in the past three decades to this shift in its strategy.22 Ralf Emmers also suggested that in the more specific period after 1995, relations between China and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Nations) members bilaterally and multilaterally reached a golden age.23 China and the ASEAN cooperated in various fields, which resulted in truly significant achievements, such as the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS in 2002, and China's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2003. One may argue that China's attitude resembled a defensive realist state only in the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, and since then its attitude has shifted to a more aggressive stance. However, I would contend for several reasons that, although there is a shift in China's SCS strategy towards aggressiveness, it is still a defensive realist state. First, during the period of de-escalation after the Mischief Reef Incident (the late 1990s to the mid-2000s), China adopted the strategy of engagement towards other claimants, with the aim of buying time to consolidate its claims in the SCS—particularly to jurisdiction over the disputed waters and maritime rights—and deter other claimants from enhancing their claims at China's expense, such as excluding China from resource exploration projects? China also aimed to reduce the influence that external powers, especially the US, had over other claimants to avoid complicating its efforts to consolidate its claim in the SCS. The adoption of engagement strategy shows that China is a defensive realist state. Second, China has never meant to be expansionist. Regardless of how other states perceive China, its claim over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands is not something contemporary. China has a well-established stance that did not appear unexpectedly nor recently. As the country becomes more developed and powerful, it adjusts its strategy to protect its interests. The importance of the SCS to China and its growing capability have made it determined to assert its interests more vigorously, yet military conflict is not a viable option for China at the moment. Third, China itself regards its attitude as self-defence. It is surrounded by the hostile attitudes of its neighbours. The strong presence of the US in the region also adds to its uneasiness. The enhanced security alliance between other claimants and external powers, especially the US, could have been China's reason for adopting a more strident approach.25 **China is neither an offensive realist state nor a pacifist state**. Its proactive behaviour in exercising what it perceives to be its rights to some extent is not beyond acceptable limits. Fourth, China never dismisses cooperation as a means to avoid conflict. In fact, the idea of cooperation in the SCS, known as Deng Xiaoping's "shelving disputes and seeking joint development," was initiated by China. The country still formally upholds this policy and has never ruled out the possibility of de-escalating the tension by reassurance and cooperation.

#### 2. Understanding defensive realism will help us understand the Chinese culture and therefore understand the beliefs and ideas of Chinese leaders.

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Unlike the domination of a single strategic culture thesis advanced by Johnston, Chinese leaders’ beliefs are probably more complicated and display significant variance over time and settings. Mao himself varied within the realist tradition between defensive and offensive realism, a distinction underemphasized in Johnston’s analysis. Further studies of the differences in the beliefs of Mao compared with those of other Chinese leaders may reveal Confucian beliefs or a shift between Confucian and parabellum beliefs across leaders. If so, Johnston’s inference that Mao’s successors are also parabellum realists would be called into question.58 Weighting the impact of cultural norms without taking into account differences between leaders would also be invalid. A leader’s beliefs are clearly influenced by cultural norms. Culture and beliefs are not independent of one another, but nor are they the same. Culture produces beliefs by providing a range of options for beliefs, but specific beliefs can be independent of culture. Although at times culture may influence a leader to translate his beliefs into decisions that mirror cultural norms, at other times those beliefs may independently steer decision-making. Culture as a structural cause limits the range of beliefs, but it does not specify which particular beliefs will function within that range. Johnston tries to specify for Chinese leaders a range of parabellum realist beliefs. This author’s follow-up research on three other Chinese leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao) clearly shows that these leaders are defensive realists with some Confucian characteristics. Other research on Chinese leaders of Mao’s time also indicates that to conclude that Mao’s revolutionary comrades were parabellum offensive realists is too hasty.59 These findings indicate that Johnston’s conclusion is too simple; the Confucian culture also functions in Chinese leaders’ range of beliefs, especially during peace under conditions of low threat. Thus, Johnston’s argument that only one strategic culture influences Chinese leaders’ beliefs should be refocused, at least during peacetime. Rather than the little or no variation within a culture that Johnston posited, beliefs may change within cultures depending on situations. To examine whether Confucian or parabellum culture is more important and when, it may be more reasonable to look at situations when no external shocks exist. In the presence of external disturbances, it is doubtful whether what is examined can be called a true indicator of Chinese leaders’ fundamental beliefs. The findings presented in this article show that Mao was hostile even during peacetime when the threat level was low. Yet this is not true for other leaders of his time. Harsh generalizations that are made about Chinese decision-making based only on Mao’s beliefs may lead to dangerous policy outcomes, causing further misperceptions and misunderstandings.

#### 3. When deciding on China, US policymakers should use Waltz’s defensive realist approach to prevent misinterpreting China’s intentions.

Bethany Archer, March 1, 2014, "Which structural realist theory offers the best guide for US policymakers as China continues to rise – Waltz’s defensive realism or Mearsheimer’s offensive realism?," Understanding Modern China, https://uosm2018.wordpress.com/2014/03/01/which-structural-realist-theory-offers-the-best-guide-for-us-policymakers-as-china-continues-to-rise-waltzs-defensive-realism-or-mearsheimers-offensive-realism/; Bethany is a writer for “Understanding Modern China,” and has written various articles on China discussing its One-Child Policy, Military, the use of realism, etc.; JL

One of the key differences between Waltz and Mearsheimer is the inclusion of intentions in their theories. “Waltz maintains that his theory is built around two underlying assumptions: the system is anarchic and states seek to survive. In other words, he is saying that you only need those two assumptions to generate security completion among states” (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 231). As a result Waltz does not believe that you can be certain of states intentions given the environment, as not all moves are aggressive, and as a result “Waltz’s states are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more orientated toward particular nonsecurity interests” (Snyder, 2002, p.153). Therefore on application to China, Waltz maintains that if we cannot be sure of their intentions we should be less fearful about the survival of the US. As a result US foreign policy makers should be take a more defensive stance towards China, and should not consider taking a pro-active approach when China’s intentions could have been misinterpreted. However, Mearsheimers view completely contrasts with this. Since “in an anarchic world where states have offensive military capabilities and might have offensive intentions, states have no choice but to fear each other” (Mearsheimer, 2006, p. 231). In other words you cannot be certain about states intentions but you can assume that if they have military capabilities then “potential hegemons always aspire to be hegemons, and they will not stop increasing their power until they succeed” (Snyder, 2002, p.153) and thus as a result will cause fear amongst the current hegemon causing a security dilemma. This can be applied to the theory of the rise of China. Since China possesses enormous, and growing, military capability, they may have offensive intentions, since they are considered to be a potential hegemon. In China “annual defence spending rose from over $30 billion in 2000 to almost $120 billion in 2010… America still spends four-and-a-half times as much on defence, but on present trends China’s defence spending could overtake America’s after 2035” (The Economist, 2012). Accordingly the US should be sceptical of China’s rise and intentions based on Mearsheimers assumptions and thus should act in a more aggressive way to prevent China becoming threatening their position as a hegemon. Clearly both arguments are based on the fundamental question as to whether the rise of China is threatening to the US. Essentially in realism this comes down to the idea of whether you perceive China to be a revisionist state or a status quo state. Chan summarises Yuan-Kang Wang’s argument by saying that “China’s conduct and experience do not quite qualify it for revisionism” (Chan, 2004, p. 154) as a result of its “adherence to international rules and norms” (Wang, 2004, p. 182). Therefore this would imply that China is contented with its current position within the international system and it has no intention to act aggressively to become a hegemon, thus it displays minimal threat to the US. However in response Chan argues that “Wang sees intentions to be invariant; that is, all states are supposed to harbor revisionist ambitions except in the case of a regional hegemon which is by definition interested only in defending the status quo. Thus, even when Ming’s China engaged in successive military campaigns of expansion, he does not see this behaviour as evidence of any intention to change the balance of power” (Chan, 2004, p. 162). I would argue that China is clearly changing the balance of power, but that this is on a regional level and not on a global one. Thus I would maintain, in accordance with Waltz, that we cannot be sure whether China’s regional rise means that they are looking to threaten the survival of the US, and as a result Waltz offers the best guide to US policy-makers. Given that the US should now see the intentions of China as attempting to gain regional hegemony in Asia, the question arises as to whether this is threatening to the US. This opens up one of the major differences between Waltz and Mearsheimer in international politics; the idea of how to survive with regards to power seeking, in the anarchical international system; that is that there is no overarching authority. Waltz and Mearsheimer both agree that the security of a state is of the greatest importance. However the key difference is how to achieve this security. For Waltz “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system” (Waltz, 1979, p. 126) therefore states will not seek to increase their power as it could be detrimental to their own survival. In his book, Theory of International Politics [1979], Waltz maintains that in order to ensure security states will attempt to balance, either internally or externally, against each other to safeguard the preservation of the international system as it is best for survival. Internal balancing involves the building up of a states military to counter an opposing state. External balancing involves a state building and creating alliances with other states to counter-balance the threat of a stronger state. Applying this to China, it seems that based on Waltz’s theory, If the US attempts to increase its power by dominating China, in an attempt to null its ‘rise’, other states will begin a process of balancing in order to counter-balance the increase in power. Thus, “for defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 21). Instead the US should not attempt to increase its power and this may be unfavourable to their own survival. The US could build up its internal capabilities or externally balance in the region; creating greater alliances with Japan and Taiwan, for example, to ensure that China cannot increase its power beyond being a regional hegemon, thus it cannot have a detrimental effect on the survival of the US. This relies on the assumption however, that regional hegemony is not detrimental to the survival of another regional hegemon. There does seem to be, as international relations theorist Randall Schweller (1996, pp. 90–121) notes, “a status quo bias” in Waltz’s theory. This is that the US are contented with being the regional hegemon of the west and that revisionist actions by China to increase their power in Asia, is not detrimental to their current power or survival. In essence it relies on the assumption that a peer competitor is not threatening to the United States and that perhaps a bipolar world in which the US is the regional hegemon of the west and China is the Asian regional hegemon is actually a more stable global order offering better long-term survival strategy for the US. Mearsheimer contrasts with Waltz’s perspective on power-seeking. He believes that: “The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 2). The key difference here is the idea of ‘preservation’ for Waltz, and maximization for Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer believes that the rising power of China will cause a complex security dilemma to occur in which there is substantial latent for war. The reason for this is based on the last part of his quote to do with being a hegemon. The USA is a regional hegemon but according to Mearsheimer “States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers so that these states will compete with each other” (Mearshiemer, 2005). The rise of China poses a problem since economically and militarily they are growing to be Asia’s regional hegemon, accordingly becoming a peer competitor to the US, causing a security complex. Based on this Mearsheimer suggests a containment policy, “just as it did in the Cold War against the Soviet Union” (Schildt, 2006, p. 240), in which they create alliances with Russia, Japan and Taiwan, amongst others, increasing their influence in the region, gaining increasing amounts of power and reducing China’s ability to become a peer competitor. The conclusion by both theorists is similar in that they both advise a policy of balancing. However they vary on a nuance point; Mearsheimers suggests the prevention by the US of China become a regional hegemon by increasing its power, whereas Waltz’s theory suggests that a regional hegemon would not threaten the US and the balancing within the region would merely prevent China attempting to become a global hegemon. Given that the intentions of China, as discussed earlier, look to be expansionary the question is whether having a peer competitor is threatening to the US. I would agree with Waltz on this point, the US have an appropriate amount of power to ensure their own survival in the international system. A rising China will lead to them becoming a regional hegemon but this is not detrimental to the US position as a regional hegemon, and they should consider China not as a peer competitor but rather as the regional hegemon in Asia which provides a more stable long term bipolar global structure. Based on my arguments on power and intentions I would conclude that Waltz offers the best guide to US policy makers on the rise of China. Nonetheless if I remove the limitations of the question to include a social constructivist perception, I believe this offers an even better guide to US policy makers. Both theorists rely on the assumption that anarchy creates security dilemmas. However social constructivist Alexander Wendt (1992, p. 395) argues that “anarchy is what states make of it”, such that threats are social constructions. Both theorists believe that the intentions of China are dubious. Mearsheimer is more sceptical of China’s intentions and offers an offensive realist approach, whereas Waltz’s theory provides a less sceptical approach but still highlights the importance of defensive strategies, to prevent any threat to the survival of the US. Wendt (1992, p. 396-7) argues that states act towards each other, based on the meaning that state has to them not as a result of anarchy. As a result the US should understand the culture, norms and identity of China to be able understand how US policy-makers should act in response to China’s rise. Understanding this would provide a better guide to whether Mearsheimer or Waltz, assuming they are the only theoretical options, offers the best approach.

#### **4. A defensive realist approach prevents security dilemmas.**

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If China’s security strategy is now firmly rooted in defensive realism, the principal implications for the United States, the Asia- Pacific region, and the world are that the outside world can afford to take a more relaxed approach towards China’s rise and that engagement with China is the way to go. While China may become more powerful, it is unlikely that it will use its newly gained power to intentionally threaten other states. And if there is a security dilemma between China and another state, two genuine defensive realist states can find a way to signal their true benign intentions and work out their differences. On that account, both China and the world have something to celebrate.

#### 5. Defensive realism allows for cooperation between states.

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In contrast, two defensive realist states do not threaten each other’s security intentionally. As a result, while there may be genuine conflicts of interest between them, some of these conflicts are not genuinely irreconcilable. Hence, while defensive realism also believes that the nature of international politics has been fundamentally one of conflict for most of human history and some of these conflicts are genuinely irreconcilable (e.g., when facing a Hitler), defensive realism does not believe that states must necessarily end up in actual conflicts whenever they have conflict of interests. Cooperation is another option for resolving conflict of interests. In other words, defensive realism believes that at least some conflicts (with size unspecified) are avoidable and unnecessary. Moreover, defensive realism believes that states can under many circumstances indeed overcome the obstacles posed by anarchy to achieve cooperation.30

#### 6. Defensive realism is better – empirics prove

Peter Rudloff, December 2013, “Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Role of Constraints,” The Midsouth Political Science Review, Volume 14 (December 2013), pp. 45-77, <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2014/02/Rudloff-2013.pdf>; Rudloff is an Associate Professor in the [Department of Political Science](http://polsci.okstate.edu/) at [Oklahoma State University](http://okstate.edu/); he teaches the introductory international relations course, upper division courses on international conflict, international law, and international organizations, as well as graduate courses on research methods and statistics; he also conducts research in the areas of international relations, international security, and civil and international conflict, with many ongoing projects; A.A.

This paper attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate between offensive and defensive realists (and other theoretical perspectives) by applying both formal modeling and statistical methods. Through the use of formal models, simple expectations regarding defensive and offensive realist theory are derived, while still incorporating a number of realist strategies within the same theoretical framework (Powell 1999, 213). Empirical tests of these expectations reveal that although both theories receive empirical support, only defensive realism receives some support across all three realist strategies (military spending, alliances, and conflict), and only when specific time periods (i.e. pre-World War I and post-World War II) are considered.

## 2NC/1NR

### China

#### China holds a defensive realist posture

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In fact, however, a more nuanced version of realism provides grounds for optimism. China's rise need not be nearly as competitive and dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests, because the structural forces driving major powers into conflict will be relatively weak. The dangers that do exist, moreover, are not the ones predicted by sweeping theories of the international system in general but instead stem from secondary disputes particular to Northeast Asia -- and the security prevalent in the international system at large should make these disputes easier for the United States and China to manage. In the end, therefore, the outcome of China's rise will depend less on the pressures generated by the international system than on how well U.S. and Chinese leaders manage the situation. Conflict is not predetermined -- and if the United States can adjust to the new international conditions, making some uncomfortable concessions and not exaggerating the dangers, a major clash might well be avoided. A GOOD KIND OF SECURITY DILEMMA Structural realism explains states' actions in terms of the pressures and opportunities created by the international system. One need not look to domestic factors to explain international conflict, in this view, because the routine actions of independent states trying to maintain their security in an anarchic world can result in war. This does not happen all the time, of course, and explaining how security-seeking states find themselves at war is actually something of a puzzle, since they might be expected to choose cooperation and the benefits of peace instead. The solution to the puzzle lies in the concept of the security dilemma -- a situation in which one state's efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others. The intensity of the security dilemma depends, in part, on the ease of attack and coercion. When attacking is easy, even small increases in one state's forces will significantly decrease the security of others, fueling a spiral of fear and arming. When defending and deterring are easy, in contrast, changes in one state's military forces will not necessarily threaten others, and the possibility of maintaining good political relations among the players in the system will increase. The intensity of the security dilemma also depends on states' beliefs about one another's motives and goals. For example, if a state believes that its adversary is driven only by a quest for security -- rather than, say, an inherent desire to dominate the system -- then it should find increases in the adversary's military forces less troubling and not feel the need to respond in kind, thus preventing the spiral of political and military escalation. The possibility of variation in the intensity of the security dilemma has dramatic implications for structural realist theory, making its predictions less consistently bleak than often assumed. When the security dilemma is severe, competition will indeed be intense and war more likely. These are the classic behaviors predicted by realist pessimism. But when the security dilemma is mild, a structural realist will see that the international system creates opportunities for restraint and peace. Properly understood, moreover, the security dilemma suggests that a state will be more secure when its adversary is more secure -- because insecurity can pressure an adversary to adopt competitive and threatening policies. This dynamic creates incentives for restraint and cooperation. If an adversary can be persuaded that all one wants is security (as opposed to domination), the adversary may itself relax. What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security -- and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

#### China is a defensive realist state and will stay that way.

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Policy- wise, the social evolutionary interpretation reduces uncertainty about China’s future behaviors. While many have complained that it is diffi - cult to apprehend China’s strategic intentions because of the murkiness of China’s policymaking pro cess, I contend that China’s security behavior has projected a rather clear picture of its security approach and its future direction. China’s general security strategy is firmly rooted in defensive realism and is gradually adding a dose of (instrumental) neoliberalism. Moreover, the social evolutionary interpretation points to the conclusion that China’s security strategy is most likely to remain one of defensive realism and it is unlikely to go back to an offensive realist mind set.

### Defensive Realism Key

#### To better understand China, we must also adopt a defensive realist mindset.

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I argue that China has decisively evolved from an offensive realist state under Mao Zedong to a defensive realist state under Deng Xiaoping and thereafter. By underscoring the major mechanisms behind this evolutionary pro cess, I further argue that China is unlikely to revert to the offensive realism mindset in its past.

#### Defensive realism is better – empirics prove

Peter Rudloff, December 2013, “Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and the Role of Constraints,” The Midsouth Political Science Review, Volume 14 (December 2013), pp. 45-77, <http://uca.edu/politicalscience/files/2014/02/Rudloff-2013.pdf>; Rudloff is an Associate Professor in the [Department of Political Science](http://polsci.okstate.edu/) at [Oklahoma State University](http://okstate.edu/); he teaches the introductory international relations course, upper division courses on international conflict, international law, and international organizations, as well as graduate courses on research methods and statistics; he also conducts research in the areas of international relations, international security, and civil and international conflict, with many ongoing projects; A.A.

This paper attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate between offensive and defensive realists (and other theoretical perspectives) by applying both formal modeling and statistical methods. Through the use of formal models, simple expectations regarding defensive and offensive realist theory are derived, while still incorporating a number of realist strategies within the same theoretical framework (Powell 1999, 213). Empirical tests of these expectations reveal that although both theories receive empirical support, only defensive realism receives some support across all three realist strategies (military spending, alliances, and conflict), and only when specific time periods (i.e. pre-World War I and post-World War II) are considered.

### DR=no security dilemmas

#### **A defensive realist approach prevents security dilemmas.**

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If China’s security strategy is now firmly rooted in defensive realism, the principal implications for the United States, the Asia- Pacific region, and the world are that the outside world can afford to take a more relaxed approach towards China’s rise and that engagement with China is the way to go. While China may become more powerful, it is unlikely that it will use its newly gained power to intentionally threaten other states. And if there is a security dilemma between China and another state, two genuine defensive realist states can find a way to signal their true benign intentions and work out their differences. On that account, both China and the world have something to celebrate.

### DR=Cooperation

#### Defensive realism allows for cooperation between states.

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In contrast, two defensive realist states do not threaten each other’s security intentionally. As a result, while there may be genuine conflicts of interest between them, some of these conflicts are not genuinely irreconcilable. Hence, while defensive realism also believes that the nature of international politics has been fundamentally one of conflict for most of human history and some of these conflicts are genuinely irreconcilable (e.g., when facing a Hitler), defensive realism does not believe that states must necessarily end up in actual conflicts whenever they have conflict of interests. Cooperation is another option for resolving conflict of interests. In other words, defensive realism believes that at least some conflicts (with size unspecified) are avoidable and unnecessary. Moreover, defensive realism believes that states can under many circumstances indeed overcome the obstacles posed by anarchy to achieve cooperation.30

### Better Than Offensive Realism

#### Waltz’s defensive realism better than offensive realism

[Bethany Archer](https://uosm2018.wordpress.com/author/bethanyannearcher/), March 1, 2014, "Which structural realist theory offers the best guide for US policymakers as China continues to rise – Waltz’s defensive realism or Mearsheimer’s offensive realism?," Understanding Modern China, <https://uosm2018.wordpress.com/2014/03/01/which-structural-realist-theory-offers-the-best-guide-for-us-policymakers-as-china-continues-to-rise-waltzs-defensive-realism-or-mearsheimers-offensive-realism/>; Bethany is a writer for “Understanding Modern China,” and has written various articles on China discussing its One-Child Policy, Military, the use of realism, etc.; A.A.

Based on my arguments on power and intentions I would conclude that Waltz offers the best guide to US policy makers on the rise of China. Nonetheless if I remove the limitations of the question to include a social constructivist perception, I believe this offers an even better guide to US policy makers. Both theorists rely on the assumption that anarchy creates security dilemmas. However social constructivist Alexander Wendt (1992, p. 395) argues that “anarchy is what states make of it”, such that threats are social constructions. Both theorists believe that the intentions of China are dubious. Mearsheimer is more sceptical of China’s intentions and offers an offensive realist approach, Waltz’s theory provides a less sceptical approach but still highlights the importance of defensive strategies, to prevent any threat to the survival of the US. Wendt (1992, p. 396-7) argues that states act towards each other, based on the meaning that state has to them not as a result of anarchy. As a result the US should understand the culture, norms and identity of China to be able understand how US policy-makers should act in response to China’s rise. Understanding this would provide a better guide to whether Mearsheimer or Waltz, assuming they are the only theoretical options, offers the best approach. Throughout this essay I have discussed two prominent differences between Waltz’s offensive and Mearsheimers defensive structural realism; they were power and intentions. I was able to conclude that Waltz offered the best explanation as to how China’s intentions should be interpreted; they are aiming to gain regional power in a particularly hostile area, and that these intentions are not aimed to be detrimental to the survival of the US, as a result American policy-makers should aim to take a defensive stance externally balancing in the region to ensure that the power of China does not grow beyond regional hegemony. Secondly I argued that given the interpretation that China’s growth implies an ambition to become the regional hegemon and that this is not disadvantageous to the survival of the US, it would be unwise to attempt to control China or to null its rise. Instead I agreed with Waltz, that too much power will be detrimental to the survival to the US and thus American policy-makers should not seek more power but maintain their current level of power within the international system by limiting China’s rise to regional hegemony through external balancing within Asia. I was also able to draw a common link between Waltz and Mearsheimers two arguments; their suggestions are based on whether the rise of China is perceived to be a threat to the current global order. This tied together my two arguments together in the sense that I was able to conclude that China is attempting to change the regional order but not the global one and thus should not be perceived as a threat to the US. I also implied that by removing the limitations of the question and including reference to social constructivism, US policy-makers would develop a greater understanding of China’s rise and thus would be able to offer better guidance. Pulling together the two analysis’ of power and intentions, combined with the understanding of China’s rise as aiming to gain regional hegemony, I was able to conclude that Waltz’s defensive realism offers the best guide to US policy-makers.

### Ethnocentrism

#### Accurate IR theory necessitates adaptation of existing theories and widespread shedding of ethnocentrism

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The field of international relations (IR) is witnessing growing efforts to challenge Westerncentrism and give more space and voice to the Global South. These efforts are happening under a variety of labels, such as, but not limited to, non-Western IR, post-Western IR, Global IR, etc. To be sure, attempts to “bring the Global South in” by highlighting and generalizing from its contexts and challenges are not new. One could think of several examples, with Dependency theory and, somewhat later, Postcolonialism being two of the most prominent approaches. But recent efforts have been broader and targeted the entire discipline of IR, especially its major theories and concepts. And they have brought in a wider range of theoretical perspectives than Marxism and Postcolonialism, including Constructivism (Acharya), English School (Buzan) and even some realists (e.g. Mohammed Ayoob’s Subaltern Realism”). But labels overlap and can be confusing. Does post-Western subsume or exclude pre-Western or premodern, or pre-Westphalian histories and institutions? Are the distinctions between West and non-West meaningful? (They are increasingly blurred, but alas, the major IR theories are yet to reflect this) What is the difference between “non-Western” and “post-Western”? I cannot speak for “post-Western”, but “non-Western” IR Theory (NWIRT), when it was first advanced in 2007, called for making critical advances to existing IR theories with the infusion of the ideas, voices and experiences from the Global South (China included). But it did not call for displacing or supplanting existing IR knowledge and theories. Displacement is both impractical and undesirable. I am not sure how far a “post-Western” IR Theory would seek such displacement. Avoiding Parallelism and Embracing Pluralism In the meantime, the idea of Global IR, as outlined and developed during the 2015 ISA Presidential Year (Acharya, “Global IR and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies, ISQ, 58:4, 2014), transcends categories such as non-Western and post-Western IR. It argues that **the discourse about the future of IR should involve multiple but overlapping conversations**. It should not be an exclusive discourse within the Global South community of scholars, but a dialogue among different theoretical and epistemological approaches. It should not run parallel to other debates about the future of IR, but intersect with them. Discourses that view the Global South or regions like East Asia as distinct and different often turn inward and as it participants draw comfort from each other without making much impact on the mainstream IR scholars. Global IR calls for theoretical and epistemological pluralism and eclecticism, across the mainstream-critical theory divide. The aim is to end the exclusion and marginalization of the Global South with the help of a variety of approaches. **This does not mean leaving mainstream theories such as Realism, Liberalism and some forms of Constructivism as is, but challenging them to shed their ethnocentrism and become more inclusive**. To be sure, there are issues that are of special concern to the Global South. Such issues might include under/development, regionalism, gender, human security etc. But these issues have received attention from both mainstream and critical IR literature, albeit in different ways. One notable exception is race which has been ignored or studied in a highly superficial way in the mainstream literature, often in a patronizing manner. In some cases, as with race and women, their study by Western scholars had led to what I have called neo-marginalization. There may be other issues out there that are so unique or distinctive to the economic, political and security predicament of the Global South as to deserve special attention. But **creating a separate school to study them may be unhelpful and unnecessary**. For one thing, the existing IR theories are neither uniform nor unchanging when it comes to reflecting and addressing the more specific concerns of the Global South. Some mainstream scholars (rather than the theories they identify with) in the West continue to resist such broadening, but the theories themselves are not a closed shop when it comes to engaging with the issues and challenges facing the Global South. At the same time, I believe that Global South scholarship should not limit itself to studying Global South issues, or issues that are of special concern to the states and peoples of the Global South. In a globalized and Multiplex World, it is increasingly difficult to draw any sharp lines between Northern and Southern issues. Global South scholars should cast their net widely and comprehensively. The challenge is to forge an inclusive global dialogue. Second Generation Challenges In developing such a paradigm of Global IR, it is no longer enough to say that the IR suffers from Westerncentrism. Nor is it enough to say that we should develop concepts and theories from non-Western history and practice. These first generation efforts have run their course. The second generation challenge for those who want to move IR forward by bringing the Global South “in” is to demonstrate that concepts and theories derived from the non-Western context can also apply beyond that specific national or regional context from which they are initially derived. This is especially a challenge for the Chinese and other such Schools of IR that are now emerging. While helpful to the task of pluralizing IR, they seem preoccupied with demonstrating how existing IR theories fail to apply to their nations or regions, but end up offering “alternative” understandings and approaches that do not travel beyond their nations and regions. Another key challenge is to bring more history and civilizations into the Global South IR scholarship. I begin my First Year Seminar at American University, entitled “Civilizations and World Orders: An Introduction to Global International Relations,” by telling the students that if they study IR from with the nation-state as the basic point of reference, they are dealing with at most 500 hundred years of history during which the West has been the dominant element. But if they study IR from the vantage point of civilizations, then they have 5000 years of history to play with, out of which Westphalianism/Western dominance is but a brief period. The place of history in Global South scholarship is rather uneven. When one talks of Latin American or African voices in IR, the emphasis seems to be on colonial and post-colonial, rather than precolonial history (or pre-Columbian, although the latter term kind of obscures the general comparability aspect of Western colonialism). The focus is on contemporary marginalization, not discovery, if not recovery of their alternative pasts. This creates an ethnocentrism within the Global South, or a kind of self-marginalization. This needs to change. I have not seen much attempt by scholars whether from the Americas (North, Central and South) or elsewhere to conceptualize from pre-Colombian history, including Maya, Inca, etc. This is in marked contrast to the efforts by scholars to bring Chinese and Indian civilizational history into IR. Last but not the least, efforts to develop a more inclusive discipline of IR, while attracting new scholars and generating research at the higher levels, is yet to filter down to the level of basic undergraduate textbooks. There is yet to be an undergraduate textbook which reflects the global heritage and scope of the discipline. The most popular texts remain stubbornly Westphalic, and with limited exceptions (more in Europe than in the US), pay lip-service to non-Western histories, voices and perspectives. To remove this bias in teaching undergraduates in IR is an urgent need but no easy task, because of the near hegemony of a few textbook publishers in the West. This is perhaps where groups like WISC and regional and national associations can play a meaningful role, provided they look past national or regional exceptionalisms and interact with each other and along with the larger community of Western and non-Western scholars that is concerned with the Global South. **The shared task is not to build an IR for the Global South but a Global IR.**

# Constructivism

## 1NC Frontline

#### Constructivism is the best approach to IR, any other theory can not attain the same level of depth

LISINSKI 12’ The Chief Operating Officer of the [Federation of Polish Student Societies in the UK](https://www.facebook.com/FederationOfPolishStudentSocietiesUK/), Community Empowerer who helps to devise and organise social and civic projects. Distinguished by Polish Foreign Minister Southampton, United Kingdom Civic & Social Organization THIS CONTENT WAS WRITTEN BY A STUDENT AND ASSESSED AS PART OF A UNIVERSITY DEGREE. E-IR PUBLISHES STUDENT ESSAYS & DISSERTATIONS TO ALLOW OUR READERS TO BROADEN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE WHEN ANSWERING SIMILAR QUESTIONS IN THEIR OWN STUDIES. MAY 3 2012 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/03/explaining-war-a-comparison-of-realism-and-constructivism/

Plato, the author of the ‘Republic’, would never consider International Relations (IR), as a discipline, as science. For Plato’s definition of knowledge assumes it has to be something certain and indubitable. [1] Neither of those conditions, however, is met by IR. There are many theories of how international political arena works, i.a. realism, liberalism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, social constructivism, Marxism, feminism, green theory, post-structuralism and many others variations of those, and all of them are equally feasible. [2] That means there is some merit to all theories, yet all of them are flawed to a certain extent. A very popular metaphor states that international relations should be understood as a set of lenses; each lens allows us to see only a fragment of the whole picture, hence we cannot limit ourselves to only one theory.  The problem arises, however, when we realize that some of these “lenses” are incompatible with each other. For instance, it is impossible to bring reconciliation between realism, that assumes constant struggle between states, and liberalism, which concludes something very opposite, meaning the possibility of peaceful and just relations. Consequently, there is a dispute between academics regarding which theory offers the most accurate explanation of the IR system. One of the most basic problems of IR is how to explain the phenomenon of war. At first it seems a very simple question – war is a military conflict between two, or more, parties. However, difficulties arise when we reflect on why wars break out. While a would say that elites in wealthy states wage wars to exploit the poorer people, a realist would argue that war is connected with human behavior, so wars are naturally occurring phenomena. Additionally, a neo-realist would assume that the absence of higher authority in international arena results in anarchical system and hence state of war.[3] Basically, Marxist each theory has its own explanation, although it does not imply that those explanations are equally accurate. Therefore the aim of this essay is to evaluate the usefulness of two theories, realism and constructivism, in accounting for war. The analysis will hopefully reveal the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. The theories of IR differ solely because they are built on different premises. Realism operates under the assumption that states are the only actors on the political stage, also known as ‘statism’ [4] and ‘individualism’[5]. Additionally, the states work in an anarchical system, meaning in the absence of higher, trans-governmental and universally recognizable authority no rules are applied in the international realm. The other assumption is that politics is driven by law of human behavior- the mix of urges like the drive for powers, will to dominate, self-interest and ambition.[6] How does all of this help us understand war? Realism offers a rather cynical explanation: we are destined to wage wars, for all politics is a struggle for power and survival. Wars may be fought either to protect or expand security of the states (both the aggressor and the attacked may fight to protect their security- one to defend its country directly, the other by eliminating the threat the other country poses to its security or interests). A clear example would be the Second World War and events that preceded the outbreak of the war. Hitler’s violation of Versailles Treaty, Anschluss of Austria and incorporation of Czechoslovakian Sudetenland may be perceived as a direct way of securing Germany’s survival as a state. Starting war with Poland and Western Europe should be perceived as purely ideological move, though war with Russia (known as Operation Barbarossa) was aimed at securing oil resources in Baku and Caucasus. The reference to law of human behavior is probably the strongest argument of realists. For it is undeniable that in the history of mankind there were many leaders or generals that fought battles for the sole purpose to feed their personal ambitions, i.a. Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Therefore realism seems as a very feasible and reasonable theory. The cynicism of realism comes from the assumption that war is unavoidable and a constant element of our nature, while ideas and ideologies are of no importance. That is ideologies serve the purpose of arguing in favor of war using various arguments at different times. We might feel insulted by this view, and yet whether it is Alexander calling his soldiers to fight for Greece, Attila the Hun persuading his to plunder the cities of Western and Eastern Rome, Napoleon fighting under the cloak of French Revolution and freedom, or Khrushchev pretending to care about working people- one thing remains constant- we fight wars.  So even though it seems as there is some development in human thought, the true intentions remains the same through ages, and wars remain an extension of politics. It is hard not to appreciate realism and its account for war, since history seems to favor it. Constructivism, on the other hand, represents much more complex approach. It views the priority of ideas and human consciousness[7], hence the core assumptions: holism[8] and idealism[9]. The striking difference between realism and constructivism lies in the approach to ideas – the latter demands that we take seriously the role of ideas in world politics, while the former completely disregards it. However, we already saw that realism has much historical evidence in its favor, so is it even possible to defend social constructivism? Not only it is possible, but constructivism even offers a much more accurate account for war. To start with, statism is a flawed concept, for history has ample evidence that state power is being challenged from both above and below. [10] The American War of Independence, French Revolution, or even the struggle between Huguenots and Cardinal Richelieu pose a certain problem for realism. Also, the logical consequence of the absence of world government is not the state of war. It is rather an option that people have selected.[11] As the 20th century has shown, the trends changed and some attempts to create a world government, or at least regional governments, have been made. The United Nations, International Monetary Fund and European Union are the main examples of this. These problems are not encountered by constructivism. That is because constructivism understands IR as a social construction: a social theory that focuses on analysis and evaluation of various elements, such as culture, society, law, ethnography, economy etc. All these issues are of the highest importance to social constructivist, for they constitute differences between states and societies across historical and geographical context.[12] Simply put, social constructivism is capable of explaining all the wars by referring not to their common elements, but distinctive features and identity. The conquests of Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar and Napoleon may be perceived as embodiments of the same cultural legacy[13] And yet, it would be an oversimplification; it is necessary to place those leaders in the context of history, for it happens that some of them were actually devoted ideologists – like Hitler, Lenin, Mussolini, Mark Aurelius or even Charles the Great. So ideas, rather than political cynicism constituted those people. Constructivism’s advantage is evident in that by focusing on social factors and by stressing the importance of context, it is capable of addressing the current civil war in Mexico between the government and narcotic cartels, which is not in the scope of realism. Constructivism is therefore to be appreciated for its accuracy, while realism may be deemed oversimplified in comparison. The essay has attempted to prove the superiority of social constructivism over realism in accounting for war. Realism, although flawed with oversimplification and inability to address various issues concerning war, remains the dominant theory of international relations. That is because although the domestic realm in many countries and across cultures has experienced a certain degree of progress, which is an unaddressed issue by realism, the international arena seems to be ruled by the balance of power. The European Union and United Nations, the organizations that are supposed to secure peace, might be understood as a realistic way to balance power. Also, politicians all over the world seem to embrace purely Machiavellian approach. As Machiavelli put it: “You ought never to suffer your designs to be crossed in order to avoid war, since war is not to be avoided, but is only to be deferred to your advantage!”[14] And so, it seems that engagement of EU and USA in Libya in 2011 was not driven by humanitarian impulse, but because the war (at least at the time) seemed to propose enormous economic and political advantages (including winning additional votes in popularity polls, as the intervention was generally welcomed by European citizens). In theory, social constructivism offers the more detailed and accurate account for war not only than realism, but than any other theory. Its focus on social factors and importance of ideas allows it to address problems that are not even in the scope of realism. Additionally, the example of liberalism, Christianity and socialism, among others, prove that ideas and ideologies can really change the world. The superiority of constructivism may be explained in a way that it is capable of explaining realism, while realism is not capable of returning the favor.

#### Current constructive perceptions of Sino-American relations are positive and foster cooperation

Pardo 14 (Ramon Pacheco, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Guided by identities? A constructivist approach to sino-american relations”, periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/estudosinternacionais/article/download/.../6724)//GLee

This article has served to show that improving Sino-American relations are to a large extent explained by the frames of reference that both countries employ to self-identify and to perceive the other. Beijing and Washington elites constructed a favourable perception of each other in the late 18th and early 19th century that is being reproduced today. These mutual perceptions have worked together with the respective corporate identity of China and the US to make cooperation between them predictable. Chinese and American elites increasingly acknowledge this. As constructivism purports, ideas and actions are mutually constitutive. Once American and Chinese mutual perceptions of two amicable great powers have become policy through cooperation at the bilateral, regional and global level it will become increasingly difficult for them to perceive the other as a threatening Other. This antagonistic percep- tion happened between 1949 and 1969. Recurrence in the near future is unlikely. As this article has shown, Sino-American mutual benevolent perceptions build on positive historical images. Reinforced by cooperation, the most likely outcome is that relations between the two current greatest powers will be defined by increasing amity and collaboration.

#### Status quo constructivism is good- it is the driving force behind current and future Sino-American cooperation

Pardo 14 (Ramon Pacheco, London School of Economics

and Political Science, “Guided by identities? A constructivist approach to sino-american relations”, periodicos.pucminas.br/index.php/estudosinternacionais/article/download/.../6724)//GLee

Irrespective of one’s approach to the study of present and future Sino-American relations it seems clear that their interactions in the early 21st century have been mostly based on cooperation. Certainly, instances of tension have occurred. However, as Ikenberry (2010) argues, China has yet to show any signs of wishing to disrupt current international structures or to challenge the US. Tellingly, tensions over issues such as the Dalai Lama’s meeting with Barack Obama, American arms sales to Taiwan and the alleged undervaluation of the renminbi have not prevented cooperation. In fact, a bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue is in place. In addition, both countries have been working together in multilateral efforts to curb the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, the US and China have recently been cooperating to manage the threat of proliferation of WMD. China and the US have worked together to contain the effects of the recent global financial crisis as well. Finally, Washington and Beijing officials met several times to reach an agreement on climate change, leading to the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009. The above would serve to prove that socialization of China has worked so far. Material considerations on the part of Chinese leaders have led them to pursue integration within the current international system. Beijing is increasingly willing to take its share of responsibility in managing the system in return for material gains. Meanwhile, American elites wish to help China integrate in the existing world order. This would reinforce the existing order, which reflects American interests. Peaceful integration of China would also avert the costs of Cold War-style bipolarity. Hence, socialization of China is a win-win situation for Washington and Beijing. However, the argument that Sino-American relations are defined¶ purely in materialistic terms seems incomplete. Ideas do matter in the¶ conduct of foreign policy (KEOHANE, 1993). From this follows that they¶ also matter in the study of bilateral relations between states – in the case of this article, relations between the US and China. The notion that nonmaterial factors matter in IR is of course not new. However, constructivism has been the main driving force behind the move beyond material explanations of IR phenomena over the past two decades. In this article the author draws from constructivist accounts of how socially constructed identities and interests shape actor behaviour. The author will argue that US-China cooperation in the period between 2001 and 2012 is partly explained by each country’s self-image and the interests associated with it. Even though material considerations are important in understanding relations between China and the US, their identities are a key driver behind cooperation between them. What the author seeks is to elaborate on American and Chinese corporate and social identities to show how Sino-American cooperation is to a certain extent the byproduct of ideas, culture and history.

#### BUT, current speech acts of China threats only further alienate China and ruins all ties which makes conflict inevitable

Patridge 12(Bryan, student United States Army War College (at the time), currently Lieutenant Colonel, “Constructivism—Is the United States Making China an Enemy?”, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561838)//GLee

Many Americans are nervous about looming future competition with China. One¶ business man returning from a visit to China “came away acutely perceptive and fearful¶ of whether America is willing and able to compete with a nation so focused, so¶ energetic, so willing to do what it takes to prosper in this new century.”83 Senior Fellow,¶ Jonathan D. Pollack, of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution,¶ says that “China looms large in the American consciousness.”84 Adding to the¶ nervousness are several books indicating tension in US-Chinese relations. For¶ example, Aaron Friedberg recently wrote China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery¶ in Asia. Other titles include Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China by Benjamin Page and Tao Xie and Superpower Struggles: Mighty¶ America, Faltering Europe, Rising China by John Redwood. Several recent journal¶ articles speak to the same subject. For instance, the National Defense University¶ publication, Joint Force Quarterly, published five articles specifically addressing USChinese¶ relations between the 4th Quarter 2011 and 1st Quarter 2012 issues. Military¶ leaders also feed public concerns, last fall, Admiral Robert Willard, the new head of¶ United States Pacific Command, noted that “in the past decade or so, China has¶ executed most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability implying that¶ maybe the alarmists are on to something.”¶ 85 It is apparent that “there is deep strategic¶ mistrust between the two countries. China’s rapid economic growth, steady military¶ modernization, and relentless nationalistic propaganda at home are shaping Chinese¶ public expectations and limiting possibilities for compromise with other powers.”¶ 86 Many Americans simply are not comfortable with a growing and influential Communist China. In July 2011 “John Birch Society members passed out literature and held up signs on the sidewalk in front of the National Governors Association Conference opposing new coziness with Communist China.”87 As we decipher whether the United States is helping to construct a future environment of high tension with China, we must remember that our speech acts highlighting Chinese “violation” of norms, as we interpret them, might only exacerbate the problem and alienate China further. According to TIME Magazine’s Michael Schuman, “Simplistic sloganeering that goes on in the United States about China only intensifies those problems and makes them harder to resolve.” 88 21 Understanding constructivism in an international theory context, and understanding that speech acts create rules and norms about how actors view issues, sets the foundation for understanding that the United States is helping to make an enemy out of China. Our numerous defense policy documents, combined with speech acts generated by our nation’s senior leaders, only fuel the negative image of China among the American people. This process becomes self-feeding and self-perpetuating. Interpretation of these speech acts and ideas is not a one sided event. While the United States domestic population interprets ideas about China, Chinese leadership and the Chinese people are doing the same. Constructivist theory predicts that when two sides continuously refer to one another in hostile and wary terms, they will “construct” a scenario in which they become enemies. The United States arguably has painted China as an enemy and security threat while at the same time identifying it as an economic competitor on the world stage. Actions by the United States decision-makers, and speech acts by United States leaders, are creating an environment of increasing hostility and mistrust. As we survey documents, speeches, and media, we can see that the constructivists may well be right. We may be “constructing” our enemy of the future.¶

#### Trade does not stop war, but shared ideologies can stop

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**Free trade was unable to prevent war in the twentieth century because by 1914**, very few people believed any longer in the idea of liberty.6 The spirit of economic freedom reached its zenith in the 1860s and 1870s. From then on a counterrevolution began against freedom. Germany was a major catalyst for the change in ideological and policy direction with its return to protectionism and implementation of many of programs of the modern welfare state.7 But France also started to move in this direction with regulations and pressures that gave the government increasing influence and, in fact, control over the patterns of French foreign investment in other countries to reinforce its political foreign policy objectives, as well as restrictions on foreign investments made inside France. And even in Great Britain, which retained the closest approximation to free trade principles for the longest time--until the opening shots of the First World War--the London investment houses would informally make sure that their foreign loans and investments did not conflict with the wider policy goals of the British government.8 The First World War was the culmination of this process, with nation and state completely becoming one as belligerent powers made all aspects of social and economic life subservient to the ends of war.

#### Trade doesn’t help tensions; democracy is what has prevented war any examples they give

**Ebeling 2’** Dr. Richard M. Ebeling is the recently appointed BB&T Distinguished Professor of Ethics and Free Enterprise Leadership at The Citadel.  He will be conducting courses such as "Leadership, Entrepreneurship, and Capitalist Ethics" as well as "The Morality and Economics of Capitalist Society."Dr. Ebeling is r ecognized as one of the leading members of the Austrian School of Economics and the author of *Political Economy, Public Policy, and Monetary Economics: Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian Tradition* (Routledge 2010).  He is currently editing a forthcoming volume in the *Collected Works of F.A. Hayek* (Univ. of Chicago Press), the noted Austrian economist and Nobel Laureate. Prior to his appointment at The Citadel, Dr. Ebeling was professor of Economics at Northwood University in Midland, Michigan (2009-2014).  He served as president of the Foundation for Economic Education (2003-2008), was the Ludwig von Mises Professor of Economics at Hillside College in Hillsdale, Michigan (1988-2003), and Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Dallas in Texas (1984–1988). 03/18/2002 <https://mises.org/library/can-free-trade-really-prevent-war>

John Aziz acknowledges that "a world war is still *possible*," but nevertheless [opines](http://theweek.com/article/index/257517/dont-worry-world-war-iii-will-almost-certainly-never-happen) that: The world has become much more economically interconnected since the last global war. Economic cooperation treaties and free trade agreements have intertwined the economies of countries around the world. This has meant there has been [a huge rise in the volume of global trade](http://www.21stcenturychallenges.orghttp//media.theweek.com/images/uploads/focus/World-trade-graph-275.jpg?199) since World War II, and especially since the 1980s. ... In other words, global trade interdependency has become, to borrow a phrase from finance, *too big to fail. ...* Of course, **world wars have been waged despite international business interests**, [but the world today is far more globalized than ever before](http://www.wto.orghttp//media.theweek.com/images/img_press/press658_map2.gif?199) and well-connected domestic interests are more dependent on access to global markets, components and resources, or the repayment of foreign debts. These are huge disincentives to global war. I'm reminded, however, that before World War I Norman Angell argued in [The Great Illusion](http://books.google.com/books?id=HwkKAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+great+illusion&hl=en&sa=X&ei=fSUaU9qzKsnooATLt4HwAg&ved=0CD4Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=the%20great%20illusion&f=false) that the increased global economic interdependence of that age would make a major European war futile and therefore that war was obsolete. As Paul Krugman [observed](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/opinion/15krugman.html?_r=0) in connection with Russia's last militaristic adventure: Some analysts tell us not to worry: global economic integration itself protects us against war, they argue, because successful trading economies won’t risk their prosperity by engaging in military adventurism. But this, too, raises unpleasant historical memories. Shortly before World War I another British author, Norman Angell, published a famous book titled “The Great Illusion,” in which he argued that war had become obsolete, that in the modern industrial era even military victors lose far more than they gain. He was right — but wars kept happening anyway. So are the foundations of the second global economy any more solid than those of the first? In some ways, yes. For example, war among the nations of Western Europe really does seem inconceivable now, **not** so much **because of economic ties as because of shared democratic values**. Much of the world, however, including nations that play a key role in the global economy, doesn’t share those values. Most of us have proceeded on the belief that, at least as far as economics goes, this doesn’t matter — that we can count on world trade continuing to flow freely simply because it’s so profitable. But that’s not a safe assumption. Angell was right to describe the belief that conquest pays as a great illusion. But the belief that economic rationality always prevents war is an equally great illusion. And today’s high degree of global economic interdependence, which can be sustained only if all major governments act sensibly, is more fragile than we imagine. *"And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars ...."*

## 2NC/1NR

### Government Actions/Perceptions

#### China’s rise is contingent upon the norms and views that the US imposes and labels them

Stewart 8(Larry Buster, Georgia Southern University, “Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century: The Political, Social and Economic Realities of China's Rise”, http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1614&context=etd)//GLee

Constructivism is not as historically established as realism and liberalism, but it is¶ an increasingly popular approach to understanding international relations that provides¶ definitive statements on U.S-Chinese relations. Constructivists stress the importance of¶ non-material factors, particularly norms, in reconstituting identities and restraining state¶ behavior. Norms are defined as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a¶ given identity”, and provide indirect evidence that embodies a sense of “oughtness”¶ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). Constructivism contends that the international order¶ is not entirely anarchic, but that it has customary modes of operation and codified treaties¶ and laws that define acceptable behavior. Norms matter, constructivists argue, because a state would not have to justify inappropriate actions if we truly lived in a world where¶ anything was allowed (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).¶ Regarding China’s rise, constructivist scholars offer similar prescriptions as¶ liberals but do not focus as much on traditional international institutions. They argue a¶ globalized civil society is looming in the twenty-first century, one that no state in the¶ modern international system can resist (Florini 2005). States will converge on a number¶ of issues, and through this process their identities and interests will be restructured¶ (Checkel 1998). This global civil society is characterized by states adhering to¶ international norms of non-aggression, transparency and cooperation (Florini 2005).¶ Thus, while realism argues China’s leaders aim for military modernization and regional¶ hegemony, constructivism believes that the norms of the liberal international order will¶ influence the direction of China’s rise and help prevent another great power war.¶ The constructivist approach also requires engagement with the Chinese.¶ Constructivist logic insists Chinese global aspirations can be tamed by changing China’s¶ identity and interests. This means that since China’s main concern is economic growth¶ and because the Chinese cannot rise without being a member of the globalized world,¶ then the forces of globalization will serve as the catalyst to prevent violence in U.SChinese¶ relations. Constructivism implies that a globalized China will have different¶ interests and a new identity because it will be forced to adjust to the pressures of a liberal¶ world order (Florini 2005). A China concerned with economic growth simply cannot¶ afford to threaten the United States because this would be counterproductive to political¶ stability (Brezezinski 2005; Bijian 2005). Thus, for China to be accepted as a respectable¶ member of the international community, and for it to continue to prosper in the future, international norms cannot be ignored. China will have to change as its ties with the¶ outside world are strengthened, and these changes will help develop new interests and a¶ new identity for China. Constructivism argues normative factors will determine the¶ nature of China’s rise because traditional power politics are ineffective in an era of¶ increasing interdependency where the ability to choose is conditioned by international¶ norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

#### International relations are held up by Identities that each state creates for itself, government actions shape the perception of this identity

Hopf 98 [Ted Hopf, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory” Summer 1998, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/isec.23.1.171>] IQ

How much do structures constrain and enable the actions of actors, and how much can actors deviate from the constraints of structure? In world politics, a structure is a set of relatively unchangeable constraints on the behavior of states.' Although these constraints can take the form of systems of material dis/incentives, such as a balance of power or a market, as important from a constructivist perspective is how an action does or does not reproduce both the actor and the structure. For example, to the extent that U.S. appeasement in Vietnam was unimaginable because of US. identity as a great power, military intervention constituted the United States as a great power. Appeasement was an unimaginable act. By engaging in the “enabled” action of intervention, the United States reproduced its own identity of great power, as well as the structure that gave meaning to its action. So, U.S. intervention in Vietnam perpetuated the international intersubjective understanding of great powers as those states that use military power against others. Meaningful behavior, or action, is possible only within an intersubjective social context. Actors develop their relations with, and understandings of, others through the media of norms and practices. In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately. Since structure is meaningless without some intersubjective set of norms and practices, anarchy, mainstream international relations theory’s most crucial structural component, is meaningless. Neither anarchy, that is, the absence of any authority above the state, nor the distribution of capabilities, can “socialize” states to the desiderata of the international system’s structure absent some set of meaningful norms and practices6 A story many use in first-year international relations courses to demonstrate the structural extreme, that is, a situation where no agency is imaginable, illustrates the point. The scenario is a fire in a theater where all run for the exits. But absent knowledge of social practices or constitutive norms, structure, even in this seemingly overdetermined circumstance, is still indeterminate. Even in a theater with just one door, while all run for that exit, who goes first? Are they the strongest or the disabled, the women or the children, the aged or the infirm, or is it just a mad dash? Determining the outcome will require knowing more about the situation than about the distribution of material power or the structure of authority. One will need to know about the culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and the structure alike. ANARCHY AS AN IMAGINED COMMUNITY Given that anarchy is structural, it must be mutually constituted by actors employing constitutive rules and social practices, implying that anarchy is as indeterminate as Arnold Wolfers’s fire. Alexander Wendt has offered a constructivist critique of this fundamental structural pillar of mainstream international relations theory.\* But still more fundamentally, this move opens the possibility of thinking of anarchy as having multiple meanings for different actors based on their own communities of intersubjective understandings and practices. And if multiple understandings of anarchy are possible, then one can begin to theorize about different domains and issue areas of international politics that are understood by actors as more, or less, anarchic. Self-help, the neorealist inference that all states should prefer security independence whenever possible, is a structurally determined behavior of an actor only to the extent that a single particular understanding of anarchy prevails? If the implications of anarchy are not constant across all relationships and issue areas of international politics, then a continuum of anarchies is possible. Where there are catastrophic consequences for not being able to rely on one’s own capacity to enforce an agreement, such as arms control in a world of offensive military advantage, neorealist conceptualizations of anarchy are most apt. But where actors do not worry much about the potential costs of ceding control over outcomes to other states or institutions, such as in the enforcement of trade agreements, this is a realm of world politics where neorealist ideas of anarchy are just imaginary. IDENTITIES AND INTERESTS IN WORLD POLITICS Identities are necessary, in international politics and domestic society alike, in order to ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order.” Durable expectations between states require intersubjective identities that are sufficiently stable to ensure predictable patterns of behavior. A world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy. Identities perform three necessary functions in a society: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are." In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors. The identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions.'\* A state understands others according to the identity it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity through daily social practice. The crucial observation here is that the producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others; the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning. For example, during the Cold War, Yugoslavia and other East European countries often understood the Soviet Union as Russia, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was trying hard not to have that identity. Soviet control over its own identity was structurally constrained not only by East European understanding, but also by daily Soviet practice, which of course included conversing with East Europeans in Russian. Whereas constructivism treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context, neorealism assumes that all units in global politics have only one meaningful identity, that of self-interested states. Constructivism stresses that this proposition exempts from theorization the very fundamentals of international political life, the nature and definition of the actors. The neorealist assumption of self-interest presumes to know, a priori, just what is the self being identified. In other words, the state in international politics, across time and space, is assumed to have a single eternal meaning. Constructivism instead assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are a variable; they likely depend on historical, cultural, political, and social context. Constructivism and neorealism share the assumption that interests imply choices, but neorealism further assumes that states have the same a priori interests. Such a homogenizing assumption is possible only if one denies that interests are the products of the social practices that mutually constitute actors and structure^.'^ Given that interests are the product of identity, that is, having the identity “great power” implies a particular set of interests different from those implied by the identity ”European Union member,” and that identities are multiple, constructivist logic precludes acceptance of pregiven interest^.'^ By making interests a central variable, constructivism explores not only how particular interests come to be, but also why many interests do not. The tautological, and therefore also true, most common, and unsatisfying explanation is that interests are absent where there is no reason for them, where promised gains are too meager. Constructivism, instead, theorizes about the meaning of absent interests. Just as identities and interests are produced through social practices, missing interests are understood by constructivists as produced absences, omissions that are the understandable product of social practices and structure. The social practices that constitute an identity cannot imply interests that are not consistent with the practices and structure that constitute that identity. At the extreme, an actor would not be able to imagine an absent interest, even if presented with it.15 The consequences of this treatment of interests and identities work in the same direction as constructivism's account of structure, agency, and anarchy: states are expected to have (1) a far wider array of potential choices of action before them than is assumed by neorealism, and (2) these choices will be constrained by social structures that are mutually created by states and structures via social practices. In other words, states have more agency under constructivism, but that agency is not in any sense unconstrained. To the contrary, choices are rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding of the practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts.

#### The rise of China poses as threat to multiple countries- this constructivist mindset causes a lack of trust and increased fears which makes cooperation impossible

Liu 10 (Qianqian, PhD candidate in Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, “China’s Rise and Regional Strategy: Power, Interdependence and

Identity”, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/255468/201004-article7.pdf?sequence=1)//GLee

Generally speaking, few constructivist scholars have directly addressed China’s rise and its¶ regional strategy in East Asia. 5 They usually put a central emphasis on the role of the¶ ideational factors in shaping China’s regional behaviour. Some constructivists stress the role of national identity6 in explaining China’s foreign policy in general (Gries 2004; Carlson 2004; Rozman 2004). From the 1990s, as Rozman has argued, China has increasingly pursued a ‘great power identity’ (Rozman 2004). The great power identity is largely shaped by a state’s enduring perception of other great powers and the interaction between them (Rozman 2004, p.120). Rozman emphasizes that these three great power relations play an important role in shaping China’s great power identity. In line with Rozman’s perspective, other scholars, such as Michael Leifer, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, explore the historical reason for China’s great power identity. Nathan and Ross suggest that, ‘in contrast to the self-confident American nationalism of manifest destiny, Chinese nationalism is powered by feelings of national humiliation and pride’ (Nathan and Ross 1997, p.34). It is true that many Chinese are proud of China’s civilization and are also shamed by the ‘century of humiliation’ (bai nian guo chi). The concept of ‘century humiliation’7¶ (bai nian guo chi), which refers to the period that Chinese suffered at the hands of¶ western imperialists from the 1840s, has a significant impact on the nature of Chinese national¶ identity. China’s economic rise since 1990s provides it an opportunity to regain its feeling of¶ national pride and, at the same time, to erase its humiliation.¶ For constructivists, whether China poses a threat to East Asia is not determined by China’s¶ substantial growth in economic and military might. Rather, it is about imagination. In other¶ words, it depends on the perceptions of how other states interpret China’s behaviour (Alagappa¶ 1998; Kang 2004). In order to evaluate the perceptions of states, Alagappa suggests examining¶ the strategies that other states use to deal with the rise of China.¶ Some constructivists, such as Kang (2004), hold an optimistic view on China’s rise. For Kang,¶ East Asian states have accommodated rather than balanced China’s emergence. The absence of¶ balancing against China is originated from a mix of interests and identities. In particular,¶ identity is central in framing how regional states interpret China’s rise (Kang 2007, p.4). Kang¶ argues that East Asian states share many similar views and principles with China regarding¶ sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Meanwhile, Southeast Asian states have¶ deep ethnic, cultural and historical ties with China.¶ Kang’s view seems over-optimistic. To some extent, the conception of sovereignty is definitely¶ important. It can be seen from China’s refusal to use multilateral institutions to solve¶ sovereignty disputes, such as the South China Sea dispute. However, Kang cannot explain why¶ the sovereignty identity, among the numerous factors and tradition in Chinese history and¶ experience, is the most important factor in shaping its current national identity. It is still¶ ambiguous as to under which condition the sovereignty identity plays a more important role¶ than other aspects, such as great power identity, in China’s identity formation. In addition,¶ Kang could not give a decisive answer to the question whether China’s ‘peaceful rise’¶ character will remain in the future, if China achieves unquestioned great power status.¶ Some other constructivists, such as Muthiah Alagappa (1998), consider that the rise of China¶ poses a certain challenge to the international community and to East Asia. The China threat, he¶ argues, comes from the perceptions of other states, which view China’s behaviour as a threat to¶ their security. These ideas have been shaped by military or economic competition. This¶ competition has created their fears and mistrust. Of However, according to Alagappa (1998), East Asian states do not have a common perception about the China threat. Some, such as Vietnam and Taiwan, perceive China as a real threat. Some others, such as South Korea, Thailand, are aware of China as a big power, but do not perceive it as a threat. Still others, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, feel a degree of threat from China. Their concerns come either from South China Sea dispute, or from the existence of¶ economically powerful Chinese communities in their states.

#### Countries actions are shaped by the social norms of that country, not calculative list of the perceived benefits

Busse 99 [Nikolas Busse, Writer with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper. This article was written when he was a Ph.D. student at Free University Berlin, “Constructivism and Southeast Asian security” 1990 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512749908719277>] IQ

All these developments speak against the realist interpretation of external defence links as tools for the creation of a balance of power in Southeast Asia. If the ASEAN countries had seen alliances with outside powers as vital to their national defence then they should have upgraded them rather than let them weaken over time. Threats like the third Indo-China war or uncertainties like the prospect of a rising China should have provided enough incentives to do so. It will be the main argument of my paper that strategies of this kind were not adopted because they were at odds with the collective identity of the ASEAN states - a factor that increasingly began to influence the security policy of the grouping. In order to understand the dynamics at work we must first take a look at some new concepts from international relations theory. The constructivist approach Constructivism is a framework for the analysis of international relations that has developed over the past decade or so (Katzenstein 1996). It is rooted in the sociology of knowledge and shares assumptions with postmodernism as well as older approaches like Hedley Bull's 'anarchical society'. The most obvious difference to realism and other materialistic theories of world politics is that constructivism takes a sociological concept of action as the starting point for theorizing about human behaviour. Realism uses a rational actor model to explain social phenomena. States are seen as unitary actors who want to maximize their self-interest under the constraints of the international system. This translates into a neverending struggle for survival, power and wealth among largely self-confined entities. The constructivist approach sees states as social actors instead, whose actions follow international or domestic rules (Andrews 1975). From this perspective, human behaviour is driven by rules, norms, institutions and identities. We rarely stop at every choice we make in our lives, take out a pocket calculator and try to determine which course of action would maximize our benefits. Instead, most of the time, we automatically adhere to the dominant social, cultural and historical norms of our times. For example, monogamy is seen as the most accepted form of sexual behaviour in many Western societies and still forms the basis for most people's love life. But this is only one 'rational' solution for achieving individual happiness in personal relationships. In Muslim societies a man can be married to more than one wife and we have to assume that he finds that course of action no less natural than a Western husband finds his. The crucial point is that two different social and religious environments create different understandings about the nature of marriage Constructivism has tried to draw upon these insights by introducing new concepts to international relations theory. One important term is identity which can be defined as a 'relatively stable, role-specific understanding and expectation about self (Wendt 1992: 397). The concept comes from social psychology and refers to the ideas that actors have about who they are and who others are. Religions are one example where people refer to themselves (or others) as Christians, Muslims or Jews, professions may be another one (being a professor as opposed to a car mechanic or a medical doctor).5 The concept is important for world politics because state identities serve as the basis of what we usually refer to as 'state interests'. Besides some very fundamental interests, such as mere survival, actors do not carry around a portfolio of interests independent of social context. The national security policies of Germany and Japan, for example, have been influenced by a state identity as 'civilian powers' which was a response to the recent histories of those countries (Maull 1990/91). Hence, using the concept in the context of foreign policy is nothing but a recognition that states are not faceless 'units' without history and domestic context. An identity is based on norms which can be defined as 'collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity' (Jepperson et al. 1996: 54). They contain specific prescriptions for action which serve as standards for guiding the behaviour of an actor and enable others to evaluate his actions. In the case of religions, the Ten Commandments serve as the norms underwriting the Christian identity. In international relations, sovereignty is probably the most fundamental norm (Ruggie 1986). It regulates the actions of states by establishing principles like self-determination or non-interference. Sovereignty is also an exclusive norm because it determines who will be an actor and who will not. In our international system the privilege of agency is almost exclusively enjoyed by nation-states. Tribal communities or multinationals are usually banned from the game of world politics. Identities do not only come from within states as in the case of Germany or Japan. They are also shaped by interactions between them. One of the most interesting hypotheses from the constructivist research programme suggests that systemic cooperation over time can lead to the formation of a collective identity among a group of states (Wendt 1994). A collective identity means that states positively identify with the fate of others. They define their interests with regard to other states and they may also develop a feeling of community. In contemporary world politics processes of collective identity formation can be witnessed in Western Europe and over the Atlantic. NATO, for example, is more than an old-fashioned alliance. It also represents the case of a successful security community among liberal democracies. And this case also helps us to understand the dynamics which shape the form of a particular collective identity. NATO's workings are based on norms reflecting the specific historical experiences and domestic political cultures of its member states (Risse-Kappen 1996). In the next part of the paper I seek to show that we can observe similar patterns in the case of ASEAN. The ASEAN norms How do we use the constructivist approach to gain a better understanding of Southeast Asian security? The answer is quite simple. We need to look at the region's history and see if we can identify norms other than selfhelp that might guide the behaviour of the states involved. I suggest that the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the right place to start our inquiry. Although officially ASEAN has not dealt with security issues until recently, its main raison d'etre has always been security. In 1967, five Southeast Asian countries decided to establish this organization in order to stabilize the region. To that end, they agreed on a code of conduct with clear relevance to regional security. Its most articulate expression can be found in the Association's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.6 In Article 2, the document states four fundamental principles that shall guide the actions of the ASEAN members: (1) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, (3) settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and (4) renunciation of the threat or use of force. These can be labelled the behavioural norms of ASEAN. The interesting point is that these norms can hardly be seen as a response to balance-of-power problems. If ASEAN had been an anti-communist gathering, as many realists have argued, then it should have developed into a military alliance against Vietnam or an organization for joint operations against communist insurgents. Declaring some general principles for international behaviour had little value from a strategic point of view because it would not deter outside powers or domestic guerrillas. That ASEAN did not adopt military mechanisms does not mean that it was not interested in dealing with the problems of regional order and domestic instability. Rather, the Association chose a mode of cooperation which was very much influenced by the historical experience of Southeast Asian leaders. In essence, the behavioural norms of ASEAN were nothing but a strong commitment to the idea of state sovereignty. Being latecomers in the international system, the ASEAN states put much emphasis on the basic rules of the game (Ayoob 1995). Like Third World countries elsewhere, the governments of the region had not forgotten the experience of colonialism and imperialism which had been their first encounters with modern international politics. The idea of sovereignty served as the legal framework for overcoming these dependency relationships and gaining equal status in the system. It also was the most important protection against the internal and external weaknesses of the ASEAN states at that time. Being too weak physically to defend their statehood against other states or domestic challenges, the members of the Association could only survive if others would respect the norm of sovereignty (Jackson 1993). As a result, the normative ideal of sovereignty became the standard prescription for almost every political disease in the region and the cornerstone of ASEAN's attempts at creating a regional order. From this point of view, international cooperation could only take place on the basis of respect for each other's national independence and integrity. The Indonesian concept of national and regional resilience, which was later adopted by the Association, became the official expression of this approach.7

### SQ Constructivism

#### Constructivism categorizes all international relations and standards as illusions; in reality states operate under complete anarchy in IR

Dornan 11

MIRIAM DORNAN, AUG 29 2011, E-International relations students “Realist and Constructivist Approaches to Anarchy” E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world’s leading open access website for students and scholars of international politics, featuring high quality scholarly content and student-facing resources. E-IR is owned and operated by a UK registered non-profit organization. (<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/29/realist-and-constructivist-approaches-to-anarchy/)> //QM

The constructivist approach to anarchy is often summed up by Wendt’s assertion that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt: 1992: 391). In this sense Wendt is arguing that “people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings objects have for them” (Wendt: 1992: 396); this suggests that our approach to anarchy is dependent upon the meaning we attach to anarchy and it is possible of “thinking of anarchy as having multiple meanings for different actors” (Hopf: 1998: 174). Central to the constructivist approach to anarchy is the inter-subjective meanings we attach to social contexts (Hopf: 1998). Social constructivism would thus ague that international relations are socially constructed and “imbued with social values, norms and assumptions” (Fierke: 2007: 168). Adem clarifies this argument by stating things only ‘exist’ because we believe them to and that “if states as well as non-state actors interact with the ‘belief’ that they are in an anarchic environment, we would be bound to witness a particular set of behaviour” (Adem: 2002: 20). This appears to suggest that a state or non-state actor’s understanding of anarchy will lead them to behave in particular ways in the social context of international politics. Constructivists, such as Hopf, argue that anarchy can be perceived as an “imagined community” where a “continuum of anarchies is possible” (Hopf: 1998: 174). This means that certain issue areas of international politics can be understood as more, or less, anarchic; the distinction between how states approach arms control and economic trade is used to exemplify this, with states worrying more about the enforcement of arms control agreements as the costs of “ceding control over outcomes to other states or institutions” are greater than they would be in trade agreements (ibid.). Again, this emphasizes the importance of inter-subjective meanings, which can be seen to predict certain behaviours in international politics. In this sense, constructivists dispute the realist notion that self-help and power politics are essential features of anarchy but rather that they are institutions effecting the process rather than structure of international relations (Wendt: 1992).

#### Rhetoric about China can cause China to feel paranoid where the only solution is conflict between the US and China

Patridge 12(Bryan, student United States Army War College (at the time), currently Lieutenant Colonel, “Constructivism—Is the United States Making China an Enemy?”, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561838)//GLee

As we move into the future, and as we try to reassure our allies about China, we¶ may end up making China feel paranoid and encircled. If we acknowledge this situation¶ now, then we can take necessary steps to prevent further tension. One way to¶ accomplish this is to tone this down the administration’s rhetoric toward China.¶ President Obama seems to be attempting to implement this strategy, much to the¶ distaste of many political, community and business leaders. While tempered rhetoric is¶ only a partial solution, it is better than ignoring the problem altogether. I believe that we ought to continually and explicitly acknowledge this dilemma – making clear to the Chinese that reassurance of allies ought not to translate directly (in their minds) into aggressive rhetoric. In order to tone down the rhetoric we must be cognizant of what we¶ say, and realize that even as we speak to our domestic population and our allies, we¶ build tension with the Chinese. It is very hard to control the public press and public leaders; all one can do is to have public officials set the appropriate tone, and thus try to set an example for others to follow. After all, official voices are the most important ones when communicating strategic issues. The fact that we are self-focused intensifies the problem. In today’s globalized world, we as a nation must work harder to see and hear the world through the eyes and ears of others. It is imperative that we understand and are aware of Chinese culture and history. Chinese culture and history feeds its grand strategy of “strategic defense utilizing conventional and unconventional diplomatic and military means in a geographic orientation and protracted manner.”89 It is possible to work compatibly with this strategy using Secretary of State Clinton’s concept of “Smart Power”, which uses “new tools and techniques available for diplomacy and development to build more-durable coalitions and networks.”90 Part of the “Smart Power” approach should include United States policy makers’ understanding of “the war of resistance strategy, and be able to develop their own unified strategy, one that encourages China to benefit from a stable world¶ order and encourages it to play a constructive role.”91 The time has passed when browbeating¶ China with our demands is likely to yield successful results. Indeed, now that¶ China is a global power in its own right, this approach may do more harm than good in¶ the long run. China is still sensitive to its past – a legacy of Western intrusion and colonialism inside their borders. It is imperative that we use a balanced diplomatic,¶ informational and economic approach before we construct a world where the only¶ remaining alternative is military conflict between the United States and China.

#### Interactions between nations are a form of complex engagement that represent a process of social learning, not simply a policy outcome

Ba 6 [Alice D. Ba, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, “Who's socializing whom? Complex engagement in Sino-ASEAN relations” 2006 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09512740500473163>] IQ

At a time of growing Chinese influence and uncertain US policies, ASEAN states have increasingly looked to bilateral and multilateral engagement not only to create a constraining web of interdependence but also to persuade China to think differently and less confrontationally about regional security and its relations with the ASEAN states. The process by which actors learn to think differently about cause and effect, means and ends, indeed self and other, however, is not well explored by constructivists. Instead, as Checkel discusses, it has been the contractual theorists that have been clearest in specifying how actors come to particular decisions about norms and compliance (Checkel 2001). The mostly legalistic and coercive processes that they emphasize, however, do not describe ASEAN’s regional processes or its particular style of informal, non-binding engagement well. Characterized by a multiplicity of interactions at multiple levels and across different issues areas, complex engagement’s holistic approach also contrasts with the focus of contractual accounts on issue-specific regimes and artificially parceled relations. ASEAN’s engagement of China is also not simply about creating interdependence or necessarily democratic change as often emphasized in more liberal accounts of engagement (Metzger and Myers 1998). Rather, complex engagement also aims to create cooperative relations by finding new areas of agreement.1 The key point about those areas of agreement is that they are shared; they need not be ‘liberal’ for them to provide the basis for stable, cooperative relations. As some have noted, so-called illiberal values can also provide the basis for community (Kivimaki 2001). Finally, complex engagement involves an ongoing, two-way process that is interactive and mutual in its flows of influence. In that complex engagement emphasizes multiple channels of interaction on a variety of issues, it does have some important similarities with Nye’s and Keohane’s neoliberal conception of ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1998: 81–95). However, I emphasize the term engagement as a way to underscore that what is taking place is an action and interaction, less a condition or situation. Where complex interdependence tends to describe a material situation by which a state’s actions may be constrained by a complex constellation of economic, military, and welfare interests,2 complex engagement refers to a social, interactive process aimed at transforming how actors conceive themselves in relation to others. As such, complex engagement is not passive, but active; not static but dynamic. Most important, complex engagement is a process, not simply a policy outcome (Johnston and Evans 1999: 236). Put another way, complex engagement is an active search for points of consensus towards persuading another to change its attitudes and/or beliefs about a particular subject, issue, or relationship. As such, complex engagement can thus be seen as an example of ‘argumentative persuasion’ – that is, a ‘process of active persuasion and recruitment’ (Adler 1997: 319–63) – described by constructivists as one mechanism of social learning. As Thomas Risse explains, argumentative behavior is like strategic behavior in that it is goal oriented; however, instead of trying to attain one’s fixed preferences, the goal is to reach a ‘reasoned consensus’ about the matter at hand (Risse 2000: 7). In this case, the goal of engagement processes is less about getting specific goods or concessions than it is to reach agreement about regional roles and relations. Sino-ASEAN relations can also shed light on conditions, as much the processes, that may make social change more likely. Discussions by Checkel and Risse provide some starting points for discussion. Both highlight, for example, how a situation of uncertainty can provide a favorable condition for social learning. Risse adds that the existence of a ‘common lifeworld provided by a high degree of international institutionalization in the respective issue area’ (Risse 2000) can also facilitate social learning. However, in cases like China–ASEAN relations in the early 1990s, where there is neither a common lifeworld nor any significant degree of institutionalization, activist agents can play a critical role in the learning process. Risse draws especial attention to the ‘conscious efforts by actors to construct such a common lifeworld through narratives that enable them to communicate in a meaningful way’. In this case, elites interested in recasting relations in a different way played a central role in making possible and more likely the more cooperative relations that exist between China and ASEAN today.3 At the same time, in ASEAN, there is also recognition that influence may also work in the opposite direction; that is, ASEAN states may hope to ‘socialize’ China to regional norms, but in their interactions they would be changed as well. Especially given the emphasis placed on power as an attracting and socializing force, the power differentials that characterize the Sino-ASEAN relationship make the socialization questions posed above all the more interesting in that they raise additional questions about the ability of smaller powers to socialize larger ones. In its examination of ASEAN’s evolving relations with China, the discussion below further draws attention to the particular conditions, contexts, and processes that define ASEAN’s complex engagement of China and that may provide further insight into processes of social learning and social change.

### AT: Other Methods

#### In an anarchic international order, the primary motivation of states becomes survival, and war becomes commonplace in the never ending struggle for ultimate security.

Griveaud 11

“Is the anarchical international system the cause of war?” MORGANE GRIVEAUD, MAY 22 2011. , E-International relations students. E-International Relations (E-IR) is the world’s leading open access website for students and scholars of international politics, featuring high quality scholarly content and student-facing resources. E-IR is owned and operated by a UK registered non-profit organization. (<http://www.e-ir.info/2011/05/22/is-the-fact-that-man-lives-in-an-international-system-defined-by-anarchy-the-cause-of-war/)> //QM

The term anarchy can have different meanings. However, in this essay we will only focus on one definition. Anarchy in the context of the international system implies there are no higher authorities, and because nation states are considered by many as primary actors in international relations, an anarchical world would be one where there is no higher authority than that of the state (Bull, 1995). The state exists as a full sovereign of its people and territory, and which enjoys the ultimate power of being completely self-determined. By taking into account Waltz’s structure of the international system, there are three elements that define it; its “ordering principle,” “the character of the units” that compose it, and “the distribution of capabilities” between these units. For the neorealist two of these elements never change. Neorealism considers the international system to be permanently anarchic because of the absence of a superior authority, and believes that all the units, or states, are “functionally alike” (Elman in Williams, 2008: 18). To some extent, states retain the same rights, the principal one being the right to do as they wish because no institution has the capacity or power to control their actions. Therefore, no order is established in this system because all actors can do whatever they want, because nothing prevents them. Nonetheless, even though states have the same rights it does not mean they have the same capabilities. The distribution of power in the international system is far from a “perfect equilibrium” (Walzer, 2006: 77). Distinct states have different powers, and the significance of these powers shift from one to another. Capabilities are not constant in the system, only the gains and “losses of power” are (ibid). States exist in a hostile global environment because nothing will hinder the possible aggression of a powerful state, and the future of a state is never certain as its power can wane. Hence, when states try to survive in such a world, their survival becomes their principal motivation. In order to survive, a state will try to reduce any external threats that could endanger its existence. As seen before, the distribution of power within the system is not equal, as some states enjoy more influence than others. However, to prevent states from becoming too dominant, a balance of power will emerge through which a state will be able to counter the growing strength of a neighbour, insofar as the neighbour threatens its security, as “balancing is the appropriate response to threatening concentrations of power” (Elman in Williams, 2008: 21). Therefore, wars happen when states fear for their safety. As Walt would suggest, a states behaviour “is determined by the threats they perceive and the power of others is merely one element in their calculations” (ibid). If we follow the balance of power theory, war occurs because they are used as preventive actions against “any state or bloc” that “becomes, or threatens to become, inordinately powerful,” because “the aggrandisement of one nation beyond a certain limit changes the general system of all” states, especially the status quo (Claude quoted in Sheehan, 1996: 3; Fenelon quoted in Sheehan, 1996: 2). Thus, if the balance of power is well managed, the status quo of the system would remain static. As long as states do not feel threatened by others, stability follows because the balance of power will not change.

#### International anarchy makes full scale war increasingly more likely.

Griveaud 11

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Nevertheless, keeping the balance of power is not an easy task for nation states. States are naturally very competitive, and an anarchical international system just intensifies interstate competition as they are allowed to act freely. State behaviour is related to competition, and in order to survive states need to show they are acting in a way where they can benefit the most from competing with other states. Neorealist states “that do not exhibit such behaviour are selected out of the system” (Elman in Williams, 2008: 18). For instance, states constantly compete over various issues to satisfy national needs. In correlation to that, the security dilemma intensifies as well (Sheehan, 1996: 8). Let us say two states are competing militarily, such as the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during Cold War. One state would face a security dilemma which was dependant on whether the other state is increasing its military capabilities. If this state chooses to believe that the possibility of an invasion is not relevant, the whole of its national security would be completely at risk and unprepared in the eventuality of an offensive, whereas if the state chooses to counter balance the other military’s capacities then it will be able to defend itself against an aggressor. The main problem with the security dilemma is the misinterpretation of neighbouring states activities. It creates issues within the balance of power because some actions that seek only “to preserve the status quo” can often be “ambiguous” and “indistinguishable” from offensive preparations (Elman in Williams, 2008: 21-22). Hence, if states have a slight misunderstanding regarding intentions, it could eventually evolve into a full scale war.

#### Without International hierarchies states are forced into patterns of never ending proliferation that make war inviable.

November 9, 2007 in World View. (https://ccline.wordpress.com/2007/11/09/how-does-the-condition-of-anarchy-shape-international-politics/)

In the absence of global government, the notion of struggle for power could put any states on the brink of war with other states and each state is responsible for ensuring their own existence and survival (self help). Consequently, each state must continuously maximize their relative power capabilities. However, since security issue is inherently zero sum it create the so called security dilemma, in which the more power obtain by one state will make other state insecure and then seek to increase its power as well. In other word any attempt a state makes to increase its own security will actually decrease its security. One of the most obvious example of the security dilemma is the rivalry between US and Soviet Union during cold war manifested through nuclear contest. Both countries continue building up their nuclear arsenals after each had acquired a secure second strike capability (Mearsheimer, 2001:7). In anarchical system, the basic motive of states behaviour is survival. In order to survive, states need to accumulate power in terms of actual power (military strength) or potential power (other aspects that support military strength such as economic and human power). However, states capabilities in pursuing power are vary greatly creating some state with gigantic military strength, some middle power states and weak states. The occupation of power also changing from time to time since states always pursue their power and compete each other. For example great powers formation in European continent has been shifted numerous times, since the era of In the late 18 century for example, French military power was the greatest in Europe and enabling her to dominate European continent for several decades. The Congress of Vienna in 1814 after the defeat of France, mark the shift from unipolar system (dominate by France) to a multi polar system, placing United Kingdom, Austria, Prussia, France and Rusia as the great powers. Major power shifts also occurred in the aftermath of the first and second world war. Austria-Hungaria collapsed after the first world war. At the end of World War II, the United States and Soviet Union emerge as the primary victors. In Asia, the fast growing economic of Japan, China and India in post war era, place the countries as the great powers.

#### States are the only international actors of any importance, and the only ruling system of power is anarchy.

Ustun 14

Serdar Ustun: Middle East Technical University, International Relations, Graduate Student. June 7th, 2014. Found on Academia.edu. (<http://www.academia.edu/10000632/What_is_Anarchy_in_International_Relations_Theories)> //QM

Wendt says that “anarchy is what states make of it”. Contrary to realist understanding that anarchy is doomed, in the constructivist thinking, Anarchy is something made rather than given. Constructivist sees the state as the main actor in international system. States are similar in terms of their behavior. The international system is not like a solar system; the units of international system are independent from each other, independent of each other’ s actions. Even though they are functionally similar by the impact of their cultural environment, 22 they react so because they do what anarchy dictated them to do. Constructivist sees the change in anarchy as possible; however the system consisting from existing practices may resist the change. 23 Norms are appropriate behaviors for actors with certain identities. 24 With interaction, states create abiding norms. These norms can enable slow progress in the system, As well as, states may change their characteristics, such as their consent to the contraction in their sovereignty against the International Criminal Court. As Adler puts it, the components of state sovereignty such as territory, authority and national identity are not fixed, but evolve with changing practices.

# Liberalism

## 1NC Frontline

#### 1. The world is becoming more and more interdependent – and that’s good

Alin 12 (Mantea, Ph.D, Faculty of Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, Revista Economica, pdf)

As the world becomes more and more interdependent, cooperation will replace competition. Interdependence creates common benefits, and these benefits encourage cooperation. Interdependence may be and it is used as a weapon. We can see an example in the economic sanctions against Serbia, Irak or Cuba.

#### 2. Interdependence is the best theory by far for describing the US and China – all other theories fail

Alin 12 (Mantea, Ph.D, Faculty of Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, Revista Economica, pdf)

The interdependence theory is an ideal theory within the international relations created as a reaction against the realist theory. This theory implies some costs but the benefits are always much more relevant. When we speak about interdependence we refer mainly to a situation of reciprocal dependences, dependences which are not all the time equilibrated, this asymmetry representing a source of power. The most important interdependence nowadays is represented by that one between the United States of America, the economic, political and military world’s leader and the Popular Republic of China, the world’s second economy, the biggest numeric army and the symbol of an innovative and efficient communist system.

#### 3. The majority of the Chinese government approaches policy towards the US by using interdependence theory

Clarke ‘06

From “*INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY, CHINA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS”* by Paul Clarke, Auburn, Alabama May 11, 2006. Doctor of Philosophy, May 11, 2006 (M.P.A. Harvard University, 1996) (M.A. San Francisco State University, 1990) (B.A. San Francisco State University, 1986). Certified by: Thomas J. Vocino Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Caleb M. Clark, Chair, Professor Political Science and Public Administration; James A. Nathan Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Carl Grafton Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Stephen L. McFarland Acting Dean Graduate School. **PAGE 139**

Papayoanou and Kastner (1998, 8) believe we can weigh the future intent of China’s leaders to pursue armed conflict by seeking to understand whether the institutions of the non-democracy are likely to permit internationalist economic concerns to wield significant influence in the policy process. The researchers consider pro-Interdependence forces in China to have a considerable advantage over those who have reason to feel threatened by such policies. The former forces are judged to be widely spread throughout the different levels of government and to work in fast growing 40 industries. Those who might be threatened by such policies (state owned enterprise, heavy industry and those agencies invested in the centralized planning system) have either been co-opted by subsidies or found other benefits in the economic growth of the last quarter century.

#### 4. Interdependence is the most important factor in the US-China relationship

Meszaros 14 ( Tamas, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute for International Studies, “Interdependence and Discord in China-US Relations,” https://www.academia.edu/17413863/Interdependence\_and\_Discord\_in\_China-US\_Relations)

This paper aims to contribute to a subdimension of this discussion, the one concerning the ties between economic interdependence and political discord in China – US relations. Economic interdependence is an especially important factor in the relationship, for it appears to be the strongest among the three causal mechanisms which, according to liberal optimists, are deemed to bring stability to China’s potentially disrupting re -emergence. Although Chinese participation in international institutions has certainly expanded in recent years, and there is indeed a wide range of common interests between China and the US in global issues, institutionalised cooperation has been less than intense between them. Moreover, while liberals continue to assume that China’s economic development will result 2 in its democratisation, this has not been the case so far. 3 Meanwhile, economic ties continue to deepen between China and the US. On the other hand, there appears to be a discord between the high level of China – US interdependence and their political relations, for their deepening economic linkages failed to mitigate continued tensions arising from an emerging strategic rivalry between them.

#### 5. Empirical data and multiple studies suggests that interdependence is accurate for the US and China

Clarke ‘06

From “*INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY, CHINA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS”* by Paul Clarke, Auburn, Alabama May 11, 2006. Doctor of Philosophy, May 11, 2006 (M.P.A. Harvard University, 1996) (M.A. San Francisco State University, 1990) (B.A. San Francisco State University, 1986). Certified by: Thomas J. Vocino Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Caleb M. Clark, Chair, Professor Political Science and Public Administration; James A. Nathan Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Carl Grafton Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Stephen L. McFarland Acting Dean Graduate School. **PAGE 195-6**

Our second research question asked: How well does IT explain the nature of the relationship between the US and China? We addressed this question, using the three tests found in Chapter 5. We began by examining the relationship between the two states, using the methods of Oneal and Russett, the chief proponents of Interdependence Theory. Using their measure, merchandise trade, we found results very similar to OR’s. The dyad has a very high level of Economic Interdependence. The US is the less constrained member of the dyad, meaning it has more freedom to initiate conflict, since its cost are less, and it has fewer domestic interests pushing for continued trade. OR’s data do demonstrate that based upon the current level of Interdependence, the potential for conflict is substantially reduced. In this section, we also examined the raw data on trade and conflict in the dyad, starting from the notion that such an examination could not be used as a proof of IT’s impact, since IT uses aggregated data from thousands of dyads. The US-China data are somewhat inconclusive, since dyadic conflict is down since the Cold War but has risen in recent years. The data do demonstrate that the highest level of dyadic conflict is down in the post-Cold War era. This finding would tend to support the concept that Interdependence does not end conflict per se but suppresses the dyad members from moving their actions to a high level of direct military confrontation, thus preserving the mutually beneficial trade.

## 2NC/1NR

### Liberalism Solves Best

#### Interdependence is the best theory by far for describing the US and China – all other theories fail

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The interdependence theory is an ideal theory within the international relations created as a reaction against the realist theory. This theory implies some costs but the benefits are always much more relevant. When we speak about interdependence we refer mainly to a situation of reciprocal dependences, dependences which are not all the time equilibrated, this asymmetry representing a source of power. The most important interdependence nowadays is represented by that one between the United States of America, the economic, political and military world’s leader and the Popular Republic of China, the world’s second economy, the biggest numeric army and the symbol of an innovative and efficient communist system.

### Democratic Peace Theory

#### Democratic Peace Theory Viable- Their Authors Biased

**Svitych**( Alexander Svitych is P.H.D. in Political Science from National University of Singapore, Masters of Arts in International Relations and European Studies, Masters of Arts with Honors in English and French Translations, “Democratic Peace Theory: Is the Patient terminally Ill or Recuperable?” E- International Relations, October 29, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/29/democratic-peace-theory-is-the-patient-terminally-ill-or-recuperable/)

The democratic peace theory (henceforth, DPT) has been a widely acclaimed proposition in international politics in the last few decades. The idea that democracies are unlikely to fight each other has been embraced by many International Relations scholars and policy-makers alike. Yet, despite its appearing elegance and parsimony, the theory displays a number of serious inconsistencies and weaknesses at closer look. Nevertheless, there is room for optimism. Although DPT in its current flawed form is a dubious conceptual tool and a policy guiding principle, a promising way to ‘repair’ the theory’s questionable nature is to find points of convergence with competing explanations. Some of these convergence strategies are sequence, sameness, relevance, and hierarchy. The shaky premises of the democratic peace theory First of all, let me offer coherent classification of existing and potential claims with regards to DPT. I propose to categorize the vast array of the theory’s weak points into definition, ontological, substantive, and methodological issues. Thus, on the definition side, different authors advocating for DPT have unpacked the meaning of democracy and autocracy in different ways. Furthermore, even commonly accepted terms appear implausible, such as a case of war defined as a conflict resulting in over a thousand victims. This is especially dubious in view of the changing nature of warfare, with information and cyber wars replacing traditional warfare in the globalized world. On the ontological side, DPT looks into a dyadic relationship, that is the relationship between two democracies. Yet, if domestic factors (whether normative or institutional ones), as DPT claims, account for the ‘peacefulness’ of democracies, shouldn’t such behaviour manifest within democracies themselves via the lack of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or civil unrest? By removing a monadic dimension DPT makes itself redundant. Moreover, some scholars have suggested that transitions to democracies can be rather violent. Focusing on the fixed and perfect conditions (democracy or autocracy) DPT displays reductionism once again. Regarding substantive dimension, DPT can be and has been used as an intellectual justification for ‘spread of democracy’ via humanitarian interventionism. Does this in turn really substantiate the peaceful nature of democracies? Besides, while DPT offers several causal mechanisms to account for the peaceful relations between democratic states, we can rather speak of correlation than causation here. Synthesis as a repair kit Based on the discussion above, what follows is a set of four synthetic solutions for DPT. In the logic of sequence, different variables exert their influence across different points in time. The revised causal logic of DPT in this case can go as follows. New democracies are still prone to follow rationalist power politics by balancing against or bandwagoning with other states; as they get embedded in economic and dependency networks with other states, economic factors come into play replacing power politics; as they get even more mature, states start sharing and projecting democratic norms, ideas and values. In the logic of sameness several explanations can be conceived at the same time. In other words, several independent variables affect simultaneously the dependent variable. For DPT this would mean that structural, economic and domestic factors all contribute to peaceful and cooperative environment among nations-states. Further on, according to the logic of relevance different states can have different preferences and intentions in the international arena. Some states are driven by power accumulation and therefore can exhibit balancing or bandwagoning behaviour. Other states are deeply embedded in the framework of international economic institutions and try to increase their benefits from globalization. Yet others can see their national interest in promoting shared values and norms across the globe. Peace among democracies appears as a by-product of all these types of motivations. The last synthetic logic proposed here is that of hierarchy. Several variables can come into play, yet they are all subsumed by a major one. As one example, realist, liberal and constructivist ‘phases’ mentioned in the sequential logic can be seen as different manifestations of a state’s power – whether military, economic, or ideational one – which structure the international arena and make it less conflictual. Thus, the core idea of power encompasses all behavioral patterns of a democracy. To sum up, different synthetic approaches can provide fresh perspectives on the subject matter of DPT and its connection to other alternative explanations. While this may seem to leave policy-practitioners in a more complex and volatile world, they actually become more aware of different possibilities out there and end up with a wider freedom of choice in the process of decision-making

### Interdependence Theory

#### The world is becoming more and more interdependent

Alin 12 (Mantea, Ph.D, Faculty of Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, Revista Economica, pdf)

As the world becomes more and more interdependent, cooperation will replace competition. Interdependence creates common benefits, and these benefits encourage cooperation. Interdependence may be and it is used as a weapon. We can see an example in the economic sanctions against Serbia, Irak or Cuba.

#### Financial situations can be explained interdependently

Alin 12 (Mantea, Ph.D, Faculty of Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, Revista Economica, pdf)

From the economic-financial point of view, the United States of America occupy the number one globally, and China the second place and this is mainly because of the existing interdependencies between the two, both because of the American investments in China and of the Chinese exports in America.

### Heg Good

#### US Hegemon Here and Good

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American Hegemony. Two other realist accounts are stronger. The first argues that the Community is largely the product of the other enormous change in world politics—the American dominance of world politics. U.S. defense spending, to take the most easily quantifiable indicator, is now greater than that of the next eight countries combined (O’Hanlon 2001, 4–5). Furthermore, thanks to the Japanese constitution and the integration of armed forces within NATO, America’s allies do not have to fear attacks from each other: their militaries—especially Germany’s—are so truncated that they could not fight a major war without American assistance or attack each other without undertaking a military build-up that would give a great deal of warning. American dominance also leads us to expect that key outcomes, from the expansion of NATO, to the American-led wars in Kosovo and the Persian Gulf, to the IMF bailouts of Turkey and Argentina in the spring and summer of 2001 and the abandonment of the latter six months later, will conform to American preferences. But closer examination reveals differences between current and past hegemonies. The U.S. usually gives considerable weight to its partners’ views, and indeed its own preferences are often influenced by theirs, as was true in Kosovo. For their parts, the other members of the Community seek to harness and constrain American power, not displace it. The American hegemony will surely eventually decay but increased European and Japanese strength need not lead to war, contrary to the expectations of standard theories of hegemony and great power rivalry. Unlike previous eras of hegemony, the current peace seems uncoerced and accepted by most states, which does not fit entirely well with realism.

#### US Heg Would Keep the Peace

Jervis 01’ (Robert Jervis, 2001, Robert Jervis (born 1940) is the [Adlai E. Stevenson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adlai_Stevenson_II) Professor of International Affairs at [Columbia University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University), and has been a member of the faculty since 1980. Jervis was the recipient of the 1990 [University of Louisville](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Louisville) [Grawemeyer Award](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grawemeyer_Award) for Ideas Improving World Order. Jervis is co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, a series published by [Cornell University Press](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornell_University_Press), and the member of numerous editorial review boards for scholarly journals. Robert Jervis holds a B.A. from [Oberlin College](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oberlin_College) (1962) and a Ph.D. from the [University of California, Berkeley](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_Berkeley) (1968). From 1968 to 1972, he was an assistant professor of government at [Harvard University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University), and was an associate professor from 1972 to 1974. From 1974 to 1980, he was a professor of political science at the [University of California, Los Angeles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_California,_Los_Angeles). He served as the President of the [American Political Science Association](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Political_Science_Association). In 2006 he was awarded the [NAS Award for Behavior Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAS_Award_for_Behavior_Research_Relevant_to_the_Prevention_of_Nuclear_War) from the [National Academy of Sciences](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_National_Academy_of_Sciences). He participated in the 2010 Hertog Global Strategy Initiative, a high-level research program on nuclear proliferation, American Political Science Review, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace Presidential Address”, pages 10 and 11, <https://ae0f863f-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/textosdepoliticainternacional/realismo---neorealismo/JERVIS_2002_TheoriesofWarinanEraofLeading-PowerPeace_APSR.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7couFyApuD2HBC6NYSv1CI5pKZtsRcwG4L-NY5ynOPGxguLRc3Finw2V_1OivRJ5vMQDNgmdG9s8LR6GHXtYuwO6Kfqtfl0iQFARkx8HdEHtOhIqdBizhvnZXCVD9vYF_sKq7-8HiM5Rd1P-aCBMi-cAGrRR6VrHZy_IMSMwB92fq97xMsACRCnpvKgRa1gAPPlJeLHu8qAQLWeb1-xcjExxu-y9jWfzKlTXO2Ouwe7RR_8IQU-> C\_0FRuSkqoeq\_bdg3axX59UwR3Z079FQSCm9ULd6ZZ1ObEogxNHTDeKyq6p5LeVJC7aQnEUB54\_kKvaWghf5OmBI8eIvrjVbtAZkEMiUwMQ%3D%3D&attredirects=0, AA)

In this world, the United States would share more power and responsibility with the rest of the Community than is true today. While popular with scholars (e.g., Ikenberry 2001; Ruggie 1996), at least as likely is a continuation of the present trajectory in which the United States maintains hegemony and rejects signifi- cant limitations on its freedom of action. National interests would remain distinct and the United States would follow the familiar pattern in which ambitions and perceived interests expand as power does. Consistent with the continuing concern with competitive advantages (Mearsheimer 2001), both conflicts of interests and the belief that hegemony best produces collective goods would lead the United States to oppose the efforts of others to become a counterweight if not a rival to it (Art 1996a). In effect, the United States would lead an empire, albeit a relatively benign one. But doing so would be complcated by the American self-image that precludes it from seeing its role for what it is, in part because of the popularity of values of equality and supranationalism. Other members of the Community would resent having their interests overridden by the United States on some occasions, but the exploitation would be limited by their bargaining power and the American realization that excessive discontent would have serious long-term consequences. So others might accept these costs in return for U.S. security guarantees and the ability to keep their own defense spending very low, especially because the alternative to American dominated stability might be worse.

### AT: Interdependence Theory Doesn’t Solve

#### The WTO serves as an empiric case to prove IT

Clarke ‘06

From “*INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY, CHINA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS”* by Paul Clarke, Auburn, Alabama May 11, 2006. Doctor of Philosophy, May 11, 2006 (M.P.A. Harvard University, 1996) (M.A. San Francisco State University, 1990) (B.A. San Francisco State University, 1986). Certified by: Thomas J. Vocino Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Caleb M. Clark, Chair, Professor Political Science and Public Administration; James A. Nathan Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Carl Grafton Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Stephen L. McFarland Acting Dean Graduate School. //JJC **PAGE 196-7**

In our examination of two dyadic events, we attempted to apply our understanding to actual events in the US-China relationship. In the WTO case, we found that IT provided a strong explanation for US motives for letting China into the WTO, while it did not explain China’s reasoning. However, IT’s strong suit in this case was not in describing past behavior, but in predicting future performance. WTO membership has improved dyadic Interdependence, increased Chinese integration with its neighbors and expanded China’s openness to the world economy. IT predicts that all of these moves will decrease China’s drive to take a conflictual approach to other states. The results of the TSC case study were less clear, since we could either speculate that IT impeded China from moving to a higher level of conflict or question why Beijing was willing to risk so much by producing a show of force against Taiwan and the US. The GG sub-variant was not useful in these cases, since it remains unknown if the concept applies to China. At the most, GG’s concept could inform policy makers that IT’s influence on China may be in doubt.

#### Interdependence theory is empirically successful, alternate interpretations of it don’t work, and more economic interdependence would be beneficial to the US

Clarke ‘06

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This research examines how the economic relationship between the United States and China impacts the potential for dyadic conflict. We employed Interdependence Theory to explain this relationship. Our purpose is to examine the strengths and weaknesses of Interdependence Theory as a framework for weighing the potential for conflict between the US and China. We investigated the reforms Deng started in 1978 and examined how China has economically opened to the world, becoming one of the world’s rising economic powers. The remainder of our methodology was designed around four tests. In the first test, we examined the US-China economic relationship unaided by Interdependence Theory methodology. We found that dyadic integration was very high and complex. Similar to v Oneal and Russett, we found that the two states have a very high level of economic integration, which translates into a significant reduction in the potential for conflict. The examination of actual dyadic conflicts suggests but does not prove that the level of conflict has been reduced as a result of Interdependence. In our next test we examined an alternative interpretation of Interdependence Theory offered by Gelpi and Grieco. They posit that Interdependence’s conflict suppressing influence is diminished if either state is autocratic. This theory would have strong implications for the US-China dyad, but in the end, our research found this variant of the theory is not yet substantiated enough to consider reformulating the overall theory. The last test was a consideration of Interdependence’s value in explaining two dyadic events, China’s entry in the World Trade Organization and the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Interdependence was useful for predicting future behavior, and in general the theory is a necessary, if not sufficient, tool for explaining the relationship between conflict and integration. Our policy recommendations supported maintaining economic engagement as a core element of US strategy, creating additional mechanisms to reduce trade friction, and promoting democracy in China in order to further reduce the potential for conflict. In general, our research supports the use of Interdependence theory as a means of both understanding economic relationships and formulating foreign policy.

### AT: Not Key

#### Theories of IR are crucial to policy making

Clarke ‘06

**We do not endorse the author’s use of gendered language**

From “*INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY, CHINA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS”* by Paul Clarke, Auburn, Alabama May 11, 2006. Doctor of Philosophy, May 11, 2006 (M.P.A. Harvard University, 1996) (M.A. San Francisco State University, 1990) (B.A. San Francisco State University, 1986). Certified by: Thomas J. Vocino Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Caleb M. Clark, Chair, Professor Political Science and Public Administration; James A. Nathan Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Carl Grafton Professor Political Science and Public Administration; Stephen L. McFarland Acting Dean Graduate School. //JJC **PAGE 168**, quoting Stephen Walt in “*International Relations: One World, Many Theories”*

Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (frequently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily. Even policy-makers who are contemptuous of theory must rely on their own (often un-stated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one's basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories -- whether he or she knows or not -- and disagreements about policy usually rest on the more fundamental disagreements about the basic forces that shape international outcomes.

#### The Clarke / Oneal / Russett interpretation of IT is the best

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Our third question asked: Given a policy of engagement and increased Interdependence between the US and China, how might US policy makers best optimize the situation? Our investigations in Chapter 6 found several implications from Interdependence Theory for US policy makers in light of US and Chinese national security strategies that call for high levels of economic integration. Oneal and Russett remain the best source of methodology for the US-China case. As Dr. Oneal reports, twenty-five scholars have published articles which have replicated their findings (as 198 reported in a telephone conversation with John Oneal, January 19, 2006), while critics have generally remained lone voices against the mainstream of IT.

### AT: Not Solve For China

#### International debt solidifies the concept of interdependence – especially between the US and China

Alin 12 (Mantea, Ph.D, Faculty of Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, Revista Economica, pdf)

There is also another chapter where the situation is vice versa and it is represented by the foreign debt. At this level the foreign debt is another element of the interdependence between the two actors mostly because the main creditor for the United States is actually China. The public debt of the United States excelled 14 trillions, reaching a historical record with 4.4 trillion debts towards foreign governments. This debt does not consist of amounts of cash borrowed but of certificates of treasury bought by those countries (Anghel, 2012). If one day all these governments decided to claim these sums, the USA would be compelled to divide and every country to “buy” one of the American states which GDP would equal the amount of the debt, the biggest debt being the one towards China. This specific debt reaches 891.6 billion dollars, the weight from the total debt being of 20.4%, emphasizing that by far the USA are indebt the most towards China (Dumitru, 2011).Moreover, the only financial evaluation agency from China considers that the SUA has already proved to be incapable of paying this debt once it had reached the maximum limit of public debt.

#### Interdependence is definitely a large part of US-Sino relations and competition

Alin 12 (Mantea, Ph.D, Faculty of Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania, Revista Economica, pdf)

We can thus observe several elements which define the economic and financial interdependence between the United States of America and China. As we could notice there are also a series of costs that this interdependence implies as well as a series of common benefits. Both countries have specific sensibilities and vulnerabilities and the future predicts to be an extremely interesting one analyzing the fight for reaching the global supremacy. China has all the premises to win the battle thus the United States still has a considerable advantage.

#### Empirical data and multiple studies suggests that IT is accurate for the US and China

Clarke ‘06

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Our second research question asked: How well does IT explain the nature of the relationship between the US and China? We addressed this question, using the three tests found in Chapter 5. We began by examining the relationship between the two states, using the methods of Oneal and Russett, the chief proponents of Interdependence Theory. Using their measure, merchandise trade, we found results very similar to OR’s. The dyad has a very high level of Economic Interdependence. The US is the less constrained member of the dyad, meaning it has more freedom to initiate conflict, since its cost are less, and it has fewer domestic interests pushing for continued trade. OR’s data do demonstrate that based upon the current level of Interdependence, the potential for conflict is substantially reduced. In this section, we also examined the raw data on trade and conflict in the dyad, starting from the notion that such an examination could not be used as a proof of IT’s impact, since IT uses aggregated data from thousands of dyads. The US-China data are somewhat inconclusive, since dyadic conflict is down since the Cold War but has risen in recent years. The data do demonstrate that the highest level of dyadic conflict is down in the post-Cold War era. This finding would tend to support the concept that Interdependence does not end conflict per se but suppresses the dyad members from moving their actions to a high level of direct military confrontation, thus preserving the mutually beneficial trade.

#### Interdependence is the most important factor in the US-China relationship

Meszaros 14 ( Tamas, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute for International Studies, “Interdependence and Discord in China-US Relations,” https://www.academia.edu/17413863/Interdependence\_and\_Discord\_in\_China-US\_Relations)

This paper aims to contribute to a subdimension of this discussion, the one concerning the ties between economic interdependence and political discord in China – US relations. Economic interdependence is an especially important factor in the relationship, for it appears to be the strongest among the three causal mechanisms which, according to liberal optimists, are deemed to bring stability to China’s potentially disrupting re -emergence. Although Chinese participation in international institutions has certainly expanded in recent years, and there is indeed a wide range of common interests between China and the US in global issues, institutionalised cooperation has been less than intense between them. Moreover, while liberals continue to assume that China’s economic development will result 2 in its democratisation, this has not been the case so far. 3 Meanwhile, economic ties continue to deepen between China and the US. On the other hand, there appears to be a discord between the high level of China – US interdependence and their political relations, for their deepening economic linkages failed to mitigate continued tensions arising from an emerging strategic rivalry between them.

#### Interdependence theory is correct in the context of US-China relations

Clarke ‘06

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Oneal and Russett provide the best understanding of IT’s impact on dyadic relationships. Generally, high levels of merchandise trade reduce military conflict in a dyad although it may increase lesser, non-military conflict specific to trade matters. As pointed out in previous chapters, China has bought into market mechanisms in a big way. It does value trade and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future as a major part of its grand strategy (see below). In addition, OR would point to China’s increasing membership in IGOs and its relative improved relations with most of its neighbors as evidence that at least two legs of the Kantian tripod are in effect in China. IT bolsters the argument that engagement and economic openness can impact China’s behavior towards the US and the West. The application of IT theory in reverse is also true. Should we significantly impede China’s trade with the US, we should expect to see significant increases in the potential for conflict from China.

#### It is in the US’s best interest to maintain interdependence with China, and any policies that move in the opposite direction would be destructive and unsuccessful

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Retain Interdependence as a Strategy Component. As noted, US strategy toward China contains both elements of engagement and containment. As a subcomponent of its strategy, advancing Interdependence serves US policy makers well. While we have pointed out the weakness of the Interdependence Theory, IT is not alone among international relations theories in lacking solid predictive qualities. IT has enough promise to retain economic engagement as a pillar of US strategy. The risks of empowering an illiberal China are outweighed by the promise that engagement will create change agents who will modernize Chinese society, promote institutions that will replace liberal ideas for those of nationalism and autocracy, and will pull China further into the community of nations. Indeed, engagement remains a viable option in part, because the opposite policy (economic disengagement) appears impractical and unachievable. The US cannot hope to contain China’s economic growth, since few nations would follow our lead and powerful business and consumer interests would likely prevent such a policy from coming into being, barring some significant aggressive act by China. A successful implementation of such a policy would merely punish US economic interests.

#### The majority of the Chinese government approaches policy towards the US by using interdependence theory

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Papayoanou and Kastner (1998, 8) believe we can weigh the future intent of China’s leaders to pursue armed conflict by seeking to understand whether the institutions of the non-democracy are likely to permit internationalist economic concerns to wield significant influence in the policy process. The researchers consider pro-Interdependence forces in China to have a considerable advantage over those who have reason to feel threatened by such policies. The former forces are judged to be widely spread throughout the different levels of government and to work in fast growing 40 industries. Those who might be threatened by such policies (state owned enterprise, heavy industry and those agencies invested in the centralized planning system) have either been co-opted by subsidies or found other benefits in the economic growth of the last quarter century.

#### The US should maintain current economic interdependence - it will lead to democracy and reduced conflict in China

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Our policy recommendations were mostly supportive of the current US approach to China. We endorsed the long-term policy of broadly engaging China across many policy realms, and we urged that economic engagement remain a strong component of this strategy. We recommended that the US promote Taiwan’s continued engagement with China, since IT applies to this dyad and since the US benefits from the resulting decrease in conflict between Taipei and Beijing. Oneal and Russett recognize that trade begets its own low-level conflict, so we acknowledged the need to create further mechanisms to address Sino-American trade differences and to anticipate future challenges in this important economic relationship. Lastly, we urged a redoubling of efforts to promote the other two legs of the Kantian tripod. Joint IGO membership can be further expanded. More importantly, we noted democracy has the most latent potential for reducing conflict between the two states, and the high level of dyadic Interdependence offers a chance for change agents to bring about democracy in China. A successful transition to democracy is important to further reducing dyadic conflict, and IT is an important tool for bringing about democracy in China.

#### Liberalism defines the US- Sino Relationship

**Columbia University** ( “Confronting the Rise of China: An Analysis of Realist and Liberal Policies,”…)

Liberal theory is rooted in the notion that by strengthening global economic and institutional ties, prospects for conflict are reduced. The cost/benefit ratio of fighting a war has been tilted away from war, which is very costly, and towards trade, which is increasingly beneficial. (p 155 Rosecrance 1999) Liberals therefore believe that the integration of China into the global economy reduces the threat of a belligerent China. As China increasingly integrates with the rest of the world, China’s social systems will also change, tending towards Western style democracy and liberalism. Economically, China has already embraced capitalism, but politically, China remains staunchly Communist and maintains an abysmal human rights record. Liberal theory suggests that economic and social forces will eventually precipitate political change as well. Liberals advocate a policy of economic engagement in regard to China. By increasing trade and tying China’s economy more tightly to that of the world, China will hesitate to initiate war for fear of the economic repercussions. The deepening of economic ties with the United States will in turn foster political development. The demand of Chinese investors for accurate economic news, for instance, has resulted in the growth of underground, stock-oriented newspapers. In this way, economic growth facilitates the growth of non-state run media to feed the public’s need for unbiased financial information. (p 155 Friedman 1999) As China develops further, the pressure to change illiberal systems such as state-run media will continue to grow. While China has thus far remained resistant to political change, the democratization of China is critical in the long run. According to the democratic peace theory, democracies don’t wage war on each other and therefore, as more countries become democratic, the potential for international conflict is reduced. (p 11 Russett 1993) A democratic China, for example, would probably be more likely to seek peaceful means for resolving the Taiwan issue. Given the benefits of a democratic China, the United States should encourage the growth of a free press, rule of law, and other liberal systems. These could go a long way in sowing the seeds of democracy in China as well. Unlike realist theory, which advocates deterrence as a means of containing China, liberal theory views such an approach as counterproductive. By clearly demonstrating America’s intention to defend Taiwan, a realist approach, the Chinese would likely view such actions as threatening and respond by building their own military further. The United States would in turn view such actions as confirmation of Chinese aggression and then respond by further deepening its commitment to Taiwan. In such a way, the prospects for war increase dramatically as a result of miscalculation on both sides. Conversely, the strengthening of economic and political ties with China and makes war with the United States extremely costly and vastly reduces the prospect for misunderstanding

#### Current Chinese Policy is increasingly Liberalistic

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As a corollary to deepening academic engagement with Kant’s thought over the past century, recent trends within Chinese international relations scholarship suggest a growing resonance with liberalism and the Kantian ideal of an enduring peace amongst states. Though still a relatively modern field, the study of international relations first began to become institutionalized in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) during the 1950s and 1960s. The PRC established a department of international politics at three major Chinese universities: Peking, Renmin, and Fudan. Across each of these departments, realism immediately emerged as the dominant theoretical paradigm and remained so for several decades, reflecting a broader global trend in the field.145 However, more recent trends in Chinese international relations scholarship suggest a growing interest in and emphasis on liberal internationalist ideas closely aligned with the Kantian project. For instance, one study of ten leading Chinese international affairs journals between 1996 and 2001 found a steady increase in three research areas: (1) multilateralism and international legal institutions, (2) international society, and (3) non-state actors and global governance.146 Another study tracked sixteen key terms associated with liberalism in major Chinese international affairs journals, finding that the frequency and attention paid to these terms increased notably in the early 2000s.147 This shift in Chinese international relations scholarship— from a decades-long emphasis on realism toward greater engagement with liberalism—is another sign of China’s growing receptivity to the Kantian project. Furthermore, the recent emergence of a distinctly Chinese foreign policy discourse, though grounded largely in classical Confucian concepts, also reveals a growing resonance with Kantian liberalism. Given China’s primarily defensive foreign policy over the past several decades, Western commentators often viewed it as a “free-rider” in the global order that lacked its own vision of international relations.148 Since the mid-2000s, however, several important foreign policy discourses have emerged as “Chinese views of international relations in the official, semi-official, and intellectual circles are being developed at an accelerating pace and with growing originality.”149 These include an initiative to reinvigorate pre-Qin Chinese theories of international relations;150 a growing literature on the “China model” as an alternative to existing paradigms;151 and an effort to re-conceptualize the Confucian concept of tianxia (“all under heaven”) as the basis for international institutions that could provide an alternative to those developed under “western hegemony.”152 In this context, some commentators suggest that China is developing an emerging foreign policy ideology characterized by three primary “exceptionalist” claims: (1) great power reformism, (2) benevolent pacifism, and (3) harmonious inclusion.153 Collectively, these aspects of China’s evolving vision of international relations seem to resonate closely with the Kantian paradigm, for they suggest that China will support at least two key pillars of the liberal peace: international institutional linkages and commercial interdependence. The first concept, great power reformism, emphasizes “the exceptionalist claim that China as a great power will challenge the historical trajectory of power rise, redefine the meaning of being a great power, and reform world politics through the development and practice of its unique international relations principles and ideals.”154 By defining China in this reformist way, contemporary Chinese policymakers aim to demonstrate that they “will strive to build a peaceful and harmonious world rather than playing the zero-sum game of power politics, and that China will provide a new ideal for the common development of all countries in the world.”155 Viewed from the Kantian perspective, this positive-sum approach toward international relations implies that Beijing will seek to strengthen economic ties and institutional linkages with other nations.